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AGAINST FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTIONALISM
Samuel L. Bray* & Paul B. Miller**
A growing body of scholarship draws connections between fiduciary
law and the Constitution. In much of this literature, the Constitution is
described as a fiduciary instrument that establishes .fiduciary duties,
not least for the President of the United States.
This Article examines and critiques the claims of .fiduciary
constitutionalism. Although a range of arguments are made in this
literature, there are common failings. Some of these involve a
literalistic misreading of the works of leading political philosophers
(e.g., Plato and Locke). Other failings involve .fiduciary law, such as
mistakes about how to identify .fiduciary relationships and about the
content and enforcement offiduciary duties. Still other failings sound
in constitutional law, including the attempt to locate the genre of the
Constitution in the categories of privatefiduciary law. These criticisms
suggest weaknesses in the new and increasingly influential attempt to
develop .fiduciary constitutionalism.
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, a number of scholars have argued that the U.S. Constitution
resembles a fiduciary document, and that it imposes fiduciary duties on
various actors, including the President of the United States. 1 When Barack
Obama was President, some found in the "fiduciary Constitution"2 a
means by which a court could hold unconstitutional the signature
achievement of his administration, the Affordable Care Act. 3 Now others
find in fiduciary constitutionalism a means by which a court could find
the present incumbent to have violated a proscription on self-dealing. 4
The fiduciary Constitution contains multitudes-everything from a handy
1 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, "A Great Power ofAttorney": Understanding the
Fiduciary Constitution (2017); Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit:
A Unified Theory ofOriginalism, 107 Geo. L.J. 1, 18 (2018); Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib &
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111
(2019); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Principles and Public Offices, in The
Oxford Handbook ofFiduciary Law 303 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff
eds., 2019); Ethan J. Leib & Andrew Kent, Fiduciary Law and the Law of Public Office:
Suggestions for a Research Agenda, Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with
authors); Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism:
Implications for Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 463 (2019);
Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory ofJudging, 101 Calif.
L. Rev. 699 (2013); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 Buff. L.
Rev. 1077, 1140 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust].
2 Different scholars writing about what we call the "fiduciary Constitution" might have their
own nomenclature. Our choice of terms, however, is not original and is not meant to be
pejorative. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1 (title); Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2182; Leib
& Shugerman, supra note 1 (title); id. at 464.
3 E.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note I, at 91-98.
4 See Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 468-69, 475.
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way for an originalist to justify Bolling v. Sharpe5 to a way for skeptics

of the non-delegation doctrine to rein it in. 6 The convenience and
malleability of this new constitutional argument should make us wary.
This Article offers a critique of fiduciary constitutionalism, finding it
bad fiduciary law and bad constitutional law. We are not the first to
criticize fiduciary constitutionalism, and our work therefore builds on that
of others, especially Seth Davis and Richard Primus.?
It is important at the outset to note that the burgeoning literature in
favor of a fiduciary reading of the Constitution means that different
scholars make different claims. Some analogize the Constitution to a
trust,8 some to an agency relationship,9 some to a power of attorney, 10 and
some to an attractively all-purpose generic "fiduciary" construct.1 1 Some

draw a straight line between a fiduciary law of the eighteenth century and
the present.12 Others admit there are differences between past and present,
and thus offer a bevy of qualifications and hedges 13-but those tend to
' See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 151-53, 170-71.

6 See

Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 479-85.
See generally Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1145 (2014) (analyzing differences between private fiduciaries and public officials and
critiquing the lack of authority for fiduciary constitutionalism); Richard Primus, The Elephant
Problem, 17 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 (2019) (critically reviewing the evidence and
methodology in Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1). Others have also criticized the overextension of fiduciary concepts, albeit in different contexts. E.g., Lina M. Khan & David E.
Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 497 (2019).

8 See Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 477-79.
9 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 112.
10 Id. at 75 (referring to James Iredell's quote regarding power of attorney).
" Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1, at 18-21; see also id. at 19 nn.81 & 83 (discussing

common fiduciary relationships and duties); cf. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 76 ("[W]e
think it close to obvious that the Constitution, as a legal document, is best understood as some

kind of agency or fiduciary instrument, whereas the case for viewing it specifically as (or as
like) a power of attorney is more attenuated."); Leib et al., supra note 1, at 708, 712-13

(recognizing differences among different kinds of fiduciaries, as well as differences between
public and private law, but relying on a general "fiduciary principle").
2 See, e.g., Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1, at 19-21.
13 E.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 6 ("[W]e are making no claims about the extent

to which the meaning we uncover should or must contribute to legal decision making."); id.
at 11 ("Again, we frame these interpretative conclusions in hypothetical form: to the extent
that the Constitution can be seen as a fiduciary instrument, or in some cases as a fiduciary
instrument of a particular kind, certain conclusions about the document's meaning follow from

that identification."). The hedges and qualifications are more pronounced-and thus the
conclusions more circumspect-in the article by Kent, Leib, and Shugerman than in some of
the other literature. See, e.g., Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2190 ("We do not opine here on the
way the framers envisioned enforcing the President's duty of loyalty and avoiding selfdealing.").
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fall away as soon as the scholars turn to spelling out the "enforceable
duties" that they want to see the courts administering.14 Some of the
literature starts out cautious and then gallops away; some of it gallops
from the start. But it all tends to be ambitious and thoroughly presentist.
This Article offers three main critiques of fiduciary constitutionalism:
The first is about contemporary fiduciary law. The fiduciary
constitutionalists pervasively treat concepts as "fiduciary" that are in fact
not limited to fiduciary law and instead have much a broader application,
such as good faith. 5 This matters because a point of connection between
the Constitution and some area that can be characterized as fiduciary (e.g.,
trust, agency), as thin as it is, cannot sustain the fiduciary constitutionalist
project if it is a point of connection with many areas of law.
The second is about historical anachronism. Some fiduciary
constitutionalists rely on a "fiduciary law" of 1789 when there was in fact
no such law.1 6 There were quite specific legal regimes for trust, agency,
bailment, and so on. Some of these were at law, and some were in equity.
Their standards of liability were different; their remedies were different;
they differed in respect to defenses and the availability of a jury.' 7 As
other fiduciary constitutionalists concede, there was no pan-subject
"fiduciary law" in 1789.18 This abstraction is fatal to fiduciary
constitutionalism.

&

14 E.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 7 ("Now to our affirmative project:
understanding the fiduciary character of the Constitution is important not simply as a historical
matter but also for its contribution to constitutional interpretation."); id. at 11; Leib
Shugerman, supra note 1, at 465 ("[T]his article delves further into this language's [i.e. the

Take Care Clause's] likely meaning, indicating how it can establish enforceable duties for
public officials."); see also Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2119 (claiming "that the best historical
understanding of the meaning of the Faithful Execution Clauses is that they impose duties that

we today-and some in the eighteenth century as well-would call fiduciary"). Richard
&

Primus and Suzanna Sherry note this oscillation in Lawson and Seidman's argument. Primus,
supra note 7, at 400, 402-04; Suzanna Sherry, The Imaginary Constitution, 17 Geo. J.L.

Pub. Pol'y 441, 447-49 (2019) (reviewing Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1). For discussion
of a similar tendency in Kent et al., supra note 1, see infra note 87.
15 See infra Part 11.
16 E.g., Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1, at 20-21 (asserting that the Constitution's
"organization and language sounds in eighteenth-century fiduciary law"). More cautious on
this point is Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2179-80 ("[W]hat the three meanings we can attribute
to the [Faithful Execution] Clauses have in common is that they are all part of the basic ways
the private law constrains fiduciary discretion and power.").
17 Contra Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 62 ("The fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee
and an attorney do not differ in any way material to our project.").
18 See, e.g., Kent et al., supra note 1, 2180-81 (describing the "crystalliz[ing]" of "the
'private' fiduciary law we would recognize today" as not occurring in America until late in
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The third is about how some fiduciary constitutionalists evade the
anachronism problem. They try to escape this problem by tying the
Constitution not to a fictional eighteenth-century "fiduciary law" but
rather to fiduciary law of the twenty-first century.1 9 That interpretive
move is certainly available on some theories of constitutional
interpretation-theories that would to a substantial degree integrate
political morality and constitutional law, or theories that would allow the
courts to legitimately turn what was originally a non-fiduciary
Constitution into a fiduciary Constitution, creating and developing new
fiduciary duties for government officers. 20 But that is not the argument
the fiduciary constitutionalists have made to date (though they are of
course free to reshape their arguments going forward). Instead, the

fiduciary constitutionalists have relied on text and structure as understood
at the Founding.2 1 And that more-or-less originalist argument does not
hold if the Constitution can only be understood as fiduciary in light of
present-day fiduciary law.

One thing, however, does need to be said in favor of the fiduciary
constitutionalists' claims. It is true that there is a long history in political
thought of the use of trust and agency metaphors for governance. This
figurative language appears in Plato and Cicero, in Locke and Hume. 22
But this language offers moral guidance and political wisdom, not

enforceable duties with remedies that can be awarded by courts. And mere
metaphor is not the big game the fiduciary constitutionalists are pursuing.

Against this long history of a figurative and legally thin understanding of
the eighteenth century, and concluding that "a fiduciary law of 'private' offices was unlikely

to have been plucked off-the-rack by the Philadelphia Convention drafters and applied to
Execution Clauses align with core features of modern fiduciary law .... "); Leib

&

public offices"); id. at 2179 ("Our historical findings about the original meaning of the Faithful
Shugerman, supra note 1, at 468 (suggesting doubt about whether "private fiduciary law was
itself fully formed at the time of the founding").
19 Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 468-69 ("[Article II of the U.S. Constitution] uses
the language of faith and care to signal to courts and to executive officials that the President
was supposed to be held to the same kinds of fiduciary obligations to which corporate officers,
trustees, and lawyers are routinely held today in the private sector.").
20 But cf. Davis, supra note 7, at 1182-95 (discussing whether that is advisable).
21 See infra notes 161 and 164 and accompanying text. We do recognize that there is a
spectrum of views about how much the interpretation of the constitutional text should be

informed by the legal categories at the time of ratification (as part of context). The more one
separates the text from its legal context, the more room there is to integrate constitutional law
and political morality, and the less constraint there is from the original understanding (with
the familiar virtues and vices of that interpretive equilibrium).
22

See infra Section I.A.
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public office as a trust, it becomes easier to recognize the fiduciary
constitutionalist project for what it is: an earnest and literalistic
misreading of the tradition and an insistence on taking figurative language
that works across thousands of years of political theory and treating it as
if it were an invocation of an inevitably more particular body of legal or
equitable claims and remedies. There is no such body of claims and
remedies that can support this move-not a fiduciary law of 1789 (once
it is recognized as a fiction), and not present-day fiduciary law (once it is
correctly described).
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes the
supposed antecedents of fiduciary constitutionalism-both the classical
and early modern tradition in political theory and also more recent
advances in fiduciary theory with which the fiduciary constitutionalists
align themselves. Part II critiques the fiduciary law of fiduciary
constitutionalism. Part III critiques the constitutional law of fiduciary
constitutionalism. The idea that the Constitution ought to be understood
as a fiduciary instrument is a well-meant and seemingly timely entrant
into the constitutional discourse of the United States. But taken together,
these critiques show that the historical, philosophical, and legal
foundations of fiduciary constitutionalism are weak.
I. THE FIDUCIARY METAPHOR

We will examine below the claims fiduciary constitutionalists make
about fiduciary law and constitutional law.23 In this Part we begin with
the supposed antecedents of fiduciary constitutionalism. Its exponents
claim that fiduciary constitutionalism is rooted (1) in a tradition of
fiduciary political theory that long predates the drafting and ratification
of the Constitution, and (2) in the work of pioneering fiduciary scholars,
including especially the Australian scholar and judge Paul Finn, who

shaped our understanding of modern fiduciary law. Both of these claims
might be thought to establish a pedigree for fiduciary constitutionalism.
In what follows, we introduce and examine each claim and find them
wanting for a similar reason: they fail to recognize the distinction between
metaphorical and technical invocation of fiduciary constructs.

23 See infra Parts II-III.
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A. The FiduciaryMetaphor in PoliticalTheory
Fiduciary constitutionalists assert that there is a pre-modern basis for

fiduciary constitutionalism in works of leading philosophers and
statesmen-works said by Robert Natelson to belong within the "canon"
that influenced the Founders.2 4 Particular emphasis has been placed by
Natelson and other fiduciary constitutionalists-including Gary Lawson,
Ethan Leib, Guy Seidman, and Jed Shugerman-on the writings of Plato,

Aristotle, Cicero, Hume, and Locke.2 5 Did any of these philosophers
espouse fiduciary constitutionalism? As it happens, in classical and early
modern political theory there is scant support for a legal construction of
constitutions or of government in fiduciary terms. One can get to modern
fiduciary constitutionalism only by extrapolating significantly on writings
in the canon-indeed, by extrapolating to such a significant extent that
one changes the sense of allusions to fiduciary concepts.
Begin with Plato and Aristotle. Did either contemplate a legal duty of
loyalty as an express or implied term of the occupation of public offices?
Did they advert to remedies for misconduct in public office similar to
those imposed by fiduciary law on errant fiduciaries in the twenty-first

century? The answer to both questions is, simply, no. Consider Plato's
Republic, where a ruler is, in the familiar English rendering, called a
"guardian." We will give especially close attention to this one word
because it is foundational to fiduciary constitutionalists' characterization
of the ideas of Plato.
In the Republic, "guardian" is a translation of <p1),aXK6g (plural of

<pi5ak). 26 This is the noun form of

cpblto>, a verb used with a wide

range of senses, including: "to guard, stand watch"; "to oversee, protect";

"to lie in wait" or "wait for"; "be careful, be cautious"; and "to guard,

24
25

See Natelson, supra note 1, at 1095-1101.
E.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 31-40; Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2119

("[D]ecades of scholarship have traced the idea of public offices as 'trusts'-private law
fiduciary instruments-from Plato through Cicero and Locke .... "); Leib & Shugerman,
supra note 1, at 464; Leib et al., supra note 1, at 708.
26 E.g., Plato, Republic, J.376c, where "pi5ka4 n6
og" is rendered "guardian of the state"
in 1 Plato, The Republic 172-73 (Loeb Classical Library, Paul Shorey trans., Harvard Univ.
Press rev. ed. 1937). The same term ((puka;) also appears throughout Plato's Laws. E.g., Plato,
The Laws, 1.625e, where "Tulari;" is rendered "the guards" in The Laws of Plato 4 (Thomas
L. Pangle trans., 1980); and XII.966b-d, where "Tong . . qsxKag . .. T&v v6 ov" and "Tov
vo~LpouoXdtv" are rendered "the Guardians of the Laws" by Pangle. The Laws of Plato, supra,
at 371. The instances in the latter passage are translated by R.G. Bury as "wardens of the laws"
and "a Law-warden." 2 Plato, Laws 559 (Loeb Classical Library, R.G. Bury trans., 1926).
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preserve, maintain." 27 The noun's usage is similarly wide, and its glosses
include: "guard, keeper, watcher"; "garrison, body of guards"; "guardian,
tutor, protector, defender"; and "observer, follower." 28 In Homeric usage
it refers to sentries. 29 Note that these are all references to activities and
roles, not to offices in Athenian law. There are other words in the same
semantic field. There is a more technical word for a joint guardian or cotrustee (auvEirtpo7tog), 30 but Plato does not use it. Nor does he choose
ic6ptog-a term that would more easily connect, in Athenian law and
social practice, with persons having powers and duties resembling those
of a trustee. 3' Nor does he use Kpopoq, another word for guardian that

already had a political association, being used for the "ephors" or
magistrates of Sparta.
For the word Plato does choose, 5cp,0, the English word guardian is
a perfectly good translation. It nicely slides between the sense of keeping
27 Franco Montanari, The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Madeleine Goh & Chad

Schroeder eds., 2015) ((p3aao).
28 Id. (cp5ka4); cf. Blair Campbell, Paradigms Lost: Classical Athenian Politics in Modem
Myth, 10 Hist. Pol. Thought 189, 209 (1989) (emphasizing "incessant vigilance" for the theme
of "guardianship" in Greek political thought).
29 For example, in Book IX of the Iliad, the word appears three times (in two forms). See
Homer, The Iliad bk. IX, lines 66, 80, 85, at 386, 388 (Loeb Classical Library, T.E. Page et al.
eds., A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press 7th ed. 1960). Translators vary in their choices,
but "sentinels," "guards," and "sentries" are typical English renderings. See, e.g., id. at 387,
389 (using "sentinels" in each instance, e.g., lines 65-67: "Howbeit for this present let us yield

to black night and make ready our supper; and let sentinels [yuoaxnrpsg] post themselves
severally along the digged ditch without the wall."); The Iliad of Homer 200 (Richmond
Lattimore trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1951) (using "guards" in line 66, "sentries" in line
80, and "sentinels" in line 85); The Iliad 175 (Caroline Alexander trans., Ecco 2015) (using
"guards" in each instance).

30 E.g., 4 Demosthenes, Orations 28, Against Aphobus 11.16, at 70-71 (Loeb Classical
Library, A.T. Murray trans., 1936) (giving English translation of "co-trustees"); Montanari,
supra note 27 (translating auvanitponog as "joint keeper or guardian").
31 See Virginia J. Hunter, Policing Athens: Social Control in the Attic Lawsuits, 420-320

B.C., at 9-13 (1994) (suggesting stewardship as a rough English equivalent and concluding
that being a "kyrios then implies not only trusteeship, possession, and use but can in some
cases amount to virtual ownership, leaving the institution fraught with ambiguity"). Adriaan

Lanni has described the xiptog:
The oldest man in the family (or, in some cases, his adult son) acted as head of the
household (kurios), controlling all the household property and serving as guardian for
the women and minor males in the family. Although the kurios had the power to dispose
of the family wealth as he wished, there was a strong ideological preference for
preserving the ancestral property intact for future generations, and it seems that the

kurios could even be prosecuted for dissipating his patrimony.
Adriaan Lanni, Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens 21 (2006) (footnotes
omitted).
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watch over something (standing guard) and preserving and maintaining
something (guardingit). But there is one problem with guardian as the

English translation, namely that it encourages the identification of Plato's
<pisk with the guardianof contemporary law.
And that is exactly the trap the fiduciary constitutionalists have fallen

into. Robert Natelson's work is illustrative. Here is the entirety of his
discussion of Plato, with emphasis added to the key clause:
Plato's most widely-read work, the Republic, outlined an ideal state
governed by philosopher-kings called "guardians," a word carryingthe
same fiduciary implicationsto eighteenth century readersas it does to
us today. According to Plato, the purpose of the state was to promote
the interest of the entire society, and the guardian was to subordinate
his interest to that purpose. The guardian also had a duty of impartiality:
"The object of our legislation," Plato wrote, "is not the welfare of any
particular class, but of the whole community." Moreover, Plato's
guardian had a certain duty of care, particularly the obligation to equip
himself with the knowledge and education necessary to make
appropriate decisions; governmental administration was an art that
untrained people should not attempt. 32

To start, Natelson seems to be making a claim about the fiduciary
implications of the English word guardian. Plato, far-sighted as he was,

did not use an English word. Natelson does not analyze what Plato said,
nor the alternative lexical possibilities, nor whether there were points of
contact between his pl6kg and Athenian law. Even as an analysis of the
English word guardianNatelson's claims are unsupported. It is not clear

what the fiduciary implications are today of any given use of the word
guardian. It might have the non-technical sense of "keeper" or the
technical sense of someone charged with caring for an orphan or disabled
person. The "fiduciary implications" of these two senses would need to
be explored. Then the semantic range of guardianin the late eighteenth
century would need to be explored. Then, in order to justify Natelson's
claim, the two semantic analyses would need to be compared-and it
would be quite striking if there were no cultural-linguistic change in the
"fiduciary implications" of the word. Yet even if one were to establish an
absolute identity of late eighteenth and early twenty-first century uses of

32 Natelson,

supra note 1, at 1097 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Plato, The

Republic 284-85 (H.D.P. Lee trans., 1961)).
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the English word guardian, it would be irrelevant for establishing that
Plato used <p5ka4 in a technical, legal, fiduciary sense.
It may seem that we have selected a particularly weak example of an
appeal by a fiduciary constitutionalist to Plato. But that is not so. Leading

fiduciary scholars repeatedly rely on Natelson's exposition.
Tamar Frankel, for example, praises "Professor Natelson's impressive

work," and notes that her references to Plato "have been derived from"
that work.33
Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota claim: "Applying the
fiduciary principle to government officials has an impressive lineage. The
notion that government keeps power in trust for its citizenry dates back to
Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero: sovereign institutions were thought to hold
citizens' interests in a public trust, constrained by fiduciary standards." 34
The authority cited? Natelson.
Evan Bernick, in a recent article on the Take Care Clause, states: "It
is ... easy to understand why the government-citizen relationship has
been conceptualized using a fiduciary framework for centuries."3 5 The
source? Natelson. 36
Similarly, in their recent article in the HarvardLaw Review, Andrew

Kent, Ethan Leib, and Jed Shugerman say that "decades of scholarship
have traced the idea of public offices as 'trusts'-private law fiduciary
instruments-from Plato through Cicero and Locke." 37 For this
proposition they cite two older secondary sources on Locke and-as their
sole authority to support the classical claim-a recent chapter by Ethan

Leib and Stephen Galoob. 38 That chapter states: "The conception that
government officers possess their offices in trust for subject-beneficiaries
dates to Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero." 39 But this sentence is the entirety of

3

Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law 280 (2011).

Leib et al., supra note 1, at 708. They cite two articles by Natelson, not only the one
already discussed (The Constitution and the Public Trust), but also Robert G. Natelson,
3

Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary
Law of the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 239, 245 (2007). The latter article does not
mention Plato and relies on The Constitution and the Public Trust for its conclusions about

Aristotle and Cicero.
3 Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where Administrative Law Meets the Constitution,

108 Geo. L.J. 1, 22 (2019).
36

Id. at 22 n.128.

3 Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2119.
38

Id. at 2119 n.35.

39 Leib & Galoob, supra note 1, at 304.
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their discussion. As authority for this proposition, Leib and Galoob cite
Natelson.4 0
The only writers in the fiduciary constitutionalism space who have
recognized the weakness of the argument from Plato are Gary Lawson
and Guy Seidman, for they choose to emphasize Cicero (about whom
more momentarily) and expressly disclaim reliance on Plato.4 1 They say:
The rulers of Plato's ideal state (and we will not make anything here of
the standard translation of those rulers as "guardians," because there is
no reason to think that Plato meant the term to have legal connotations,
or even that there were any relevant Greek legal institutions or concepts
to which the term might refer) were expected to rule on behalf of the
community rather than themselves-and indeed were expected to live
a most, for lack of a better term, Spartan life.4 2
The parenthetical qualification is revealing.

And Aristotle? In the Nicomachean Ethics, he describes the ruler as a
"guardian of justice."4 3 Again the same word is used: <n5Xa4. Here
Natelson is a little more circumspect in drawing implications and contents
himself with summary." Again Natelson is apparently the only source

relied on in the literature as establishing the ancient Greek origins of a
specifically "fiduciary" understanding of public office.4 5
The key question about classical references to "guardians" is what they
imply when unadorned by specific indication of their legal significance.
Many words used in law are used in technical senses. Return to the
English word guardian: it can have a technical legal sense which, as a
designation attached to a person, office, or relationship, imports

40 Id. at 304 n.2. For the two articles by Natelson cited, see supra note 34. Similarly, in their
article on self-pardons, Leib and Shugerman claim that "[t]he recent re-discovery of the
fiduciary foundations of state authority can trace itself back to Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero,"
but the only authorities cited are the same two articles by Natelson. See Leib & Shugerman,
supra note 1, at 464 n.1.
41 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 36.
42 Id. (footnotes omitted).

a Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle 158 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., London,
Macmillan and Co. 7th ed. 1920) (1892); see also Aristotle, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
bks. V & X, at 37 (F.A. Paley trans., Cambridge, J. Hall & Son 1872) (describing "the ruler"
as "the guardian of what is just").
4 See Natelson, supra note 1, at 1097-99.
45

See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 36-37, 181 n.54; Leib & Galoob, supra

note 1, at 304 n.2; Leib et al., supra note 1, at 708 n.43; Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at

464 n.1.
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prevailing law establishing the incidents of legal guardianship. But the
word also has a wider colloquial meaning. A guardian in the technical
sense was and is subject to a range of legal duties and liabilities, and is
endowed with a set of rights and powers to enable him or her to effectively
administer the affairs and property of an incapable ward. A guardian in
the colloquial sense is just someone who has the care or protection of
another. The Guardians of the Galaxy do not have legally enforceable
fiduciary duties.
So: should we understand Plato and Aristotle to have been thinking of
something like "guardianship" in a technical or colloquial sense? There is
no textual indication of a technical legal meaning. The more plausible
interpretation is that they meant to emphasize something more
amorphous: that statesmen should recognize that theirs is a calling to

statecraft, and that the latter implies a moral undertaking of vigilance, 4 6
as well as an assumption of moral responsibility for the welfare of
members of a polity. Rulers are the sentinels-or, if the term could be
used without misunderstanding, one might say the night-watchmen-of
the people.

Cicero, renowned for his deep learning in law, is also said by
proponents of fiduciary constitutionalism to have advocated a conception
of government that is recognizably fiduciary in the juridical sense. 47 In
De Officiis, invoking Plato, he writes that statesmen have been entrusted
with the care of citizens, and that they must respect that trust by acting in
citizens' interests: "For the administration of the government, like the
office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to

4

See Campbell, supra note 28, at 209 ("'[G]uardianship' (nomophulakein) is one of the

oldest and most frequently recurrent themes in Athenian discussions of participation. From

time immemorial the Areopagus had been officially designated Guardian of the Laws, a
position it had retained through the constitutional reorganizations of Solon and
Cleisthenes.... Fundamental to Athenian political awareness is the belief that the consitution
[sic] requires the citizen's incessant vigilance if it is to preserve its integrity." (footnotes

omitted)).
" Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 Yale L.J.
1820, 1822 (2016) ("The idea that fiduciary principles apply to public offices (rather than
solely to relationships in private law, where fiduciary norms originate) has a long pedigree,
with roots in the writings of Cicero, Grotius, Locke, and The Federalist Papers."); Natelson,
supra note 1, at 1099-1101. Note, however, that in a forthcoming article Leib and Kent offer
a more modest claim, and one with which we agree: "[T]he figurative use of trusteeships for
conceiving of public offices can trace back to Roman law ideas .... " Leib & Kent, supra note

1(manuscript at 4).
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one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted." 48 Here Cicero uses the
word tutela (from which we derive the English tutelage). It has a similar
non-technical sense of guarding and keeping as well as a technical sense
of being the guardian of a minor.49 Cicero is indeed making an analogy to
a trustee of a person, or a guardian in a technical sense. But it is, expressly,
an analogy: like the office of a trustee. If Cicero meant to suggest that

statecraft entails trusteeship or guardianship in a juridical sense, he of all
people would have avoided figurative language. 50
For fiduciary constitutionalists, it is important to see Cicero as standing

in continuity with Plato and Aristotle: "Cicero, of course, was not writing
on a blank slate. He expressly took Plato as the jumping-off point for his

discussion, folding Plato's rules for governance into the fiduciary law of
Rome." 5 1 But once it is clear that Plato and Aristotle were not treating
rulers as fiduciaries in a legal sense, the connection cuts the other way.

That is, Cicero's use of analogy is entirely consistent with Plato and
Aristotle's use of a non-technical Greek term for one who watches over
or cares for another. Writing self-consciously in this tradition, and
drawing on Plato,5 1 Cicero is speaking about the moral virtues and duties
of the ruler, not about legally enforceable obligations that are incumbent
upon a ruler. Indeed, the latter move would have represented a marked
departure from Plato and Aristotle.

Finally, scholars have attributed fiduciary concepts of leadership to
John Locke, 53 and David Hume has been said to have "promoted the
notion that the king had fiduciary-style obligations." 54 Did they? Again,
48 Cicero, De Officiis ("On Duties") bk. I, at 86 sect. 85-87 (Walter Miller trans., Macmillan
Co. 1913) (emphasis added); see also Cicero, De Officiis, in Ethical Writings of Cicero: De

&

Officiis; De Senectute; De Amicitia, and Scipio's Dream 1, 54 (Andrew P. Peabody ed.
trans., Boston, Little, Brown, & Company 1887) (1883) ("For, as the guardianship of a minor,
so the administration of the state is to be conducted for the benefit, not of those to whom it is
intrusted, but of those who are intrusted to their care."); Daniel Lee, "The State is a Minor":
Fiduciary Concepts of Government in the Roman Law of Guardianship, in Fiduciary
Government 119 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018).
49 See 2 Oxford Latin Dictionary 2199 (P.G.W. Glare ed., 2012) (tutla).

50 For discussion of this and other uses by Cicero of the guardianship analogy, see Lawson
& Seidman, supra note 1, at 33-37.

5' Id. at 36.
52 Cicero, De Officiis ("On Duties") bk. I, at 87 sect. 85 (Walter Miller trans., Macmillan
Co. 1913).

53 David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law's Lessons for Deliberative Democracy,
91 B.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1254 (2011) ("John Locke and our nation's founders already understood
that public officials are fundamentally fiduciaries for the people .... ").
54 See Natelson, supra note 1, at 1107.
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the evidence is thin. Hume refers fleetingly in broad terms to public office
as a "trust" and to misconduct in public office as a "breach of trust." 5 5
Locke's more extensive treatment speaks of a "[f]iduciary [p]ower" and
"[f]iduciary [t]rust" having been reposed in legislators, and emphasizes
that they are removable by the people where in breach of "trust." 56
But what is meant by references to trust, breach of trust, and the threat
of removal? These are evidently not suggestions that public officials
engage in public administration in the manner that trustees are required to
administer trusts, subject to equitable supervision, regulation, and
remedies. The enforcer, as it were, is not a court exercising equitable
jurisdiction, but the people imposing discipline through elections or, in
extremis, by rebellion. 57 Moreover, express trusts provide for the

administration of trust property under the terms of a deed or settlement.
Yet public office is not premised on an undertaking pursuant to a deed or
settlement transferring property to a trustee for administration on

specified terms. And although public administration often involves the
administration of public property, the administration of property counts

for but a small fraction of the objects of public offices. Hume and Locke
can therefore not plausibly be taken to have invoked "trust" in the
juridical sense. 58 Rather, they appear to have meant something like what
Cicero meant by his reference to trusteeship. As Richard Primus puts it,
"Locke was using the trust idea as an illustrative metaphor, not as a source
of transposable rules." 5 9

There is indeed, then, a recognizable tradition that runs from Plato and
Aristotle through Cicero to Locke and Hume. It is not that public officials
are fiduciaries, but that public officials are, in certain respects, like
fiduciaries. Public officials should exhibit the other-regarding virtues that
an idealized Roman guardian and English trustee were called to exhibit.

s Natelson, supra note 1, at 1107 n.124 (citing 2 David Hume, The History of England from
the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, at 41 (Liberty Fund 1983) (1778); 4
id. at 177; id. at 374).
56 John Locke,

An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil

Government, in Two Treatises of Government 217, 369, 376-77 (London, Awnsham
Churchill 1690).
57 Id. at 269 ("[W]ho shall be Judge whether the Prince, or Legislative, act contrary to their
Trust? ... The People shall be [the] Judge .... " (emphasis added)).
58 See Primus, supra note 7, at 382-83 ("[T]he leading modern scholars of Locke's political
thought have taken the view ...

that Locke was using the idea metaphorically, to make some

general points at a high level of abstraction.").
59 Id. at 383.
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Public officials must, as a matter of political morality, exercise their
mandates in the interests of the polity in general.

We wish to underscore that we have no quarrel with this tradition of
political theory. We do think that public officials-in republics and
otherwise-are morally obligated to serve the interests of the people. Our
quarrel is with a literalistic misreading of the tradition. In the hands of
skillful rhetoricians, the obligation to serve the interests of the people may
be expressed figuratively, with analogies, metaphors, allegories, and
parables, as shown by works as varied as Cicero's analogy and Jotham's
parable. 60 If we say that a good ruler is like a shepherd or that a bad ruler
is like a bramble bush, no one misunderstands. It is serious figurative
language, but it is figurative language.
B. The FiduciaryMetaphor in the FiduciaryCanon

Understandably, fiduciary constitutionalists' historical claims are
largely centered on parsing constitutional text and deciphering the
understandings of the Founders. But they have also sought to ground their

project in leading work of fiduciary law and theory-works belonging
within the "fiduciary canon," so to speak.
One of the difficulties with this strategy is reflected in the fact that one
must refer to this "canon" in scare quotes-not to highlight the special
interpretive use to which a body of work is being put by fiduciary

constitutionalists (as was true of the political theory canon) but to
highlight the thinness of appeals to fiduciary scholarship as canonical.
That is not a knock on the quality of scholarly work in this area; it is just
to point out that we have yet to develop the historical perspective to be

able to tell what might prove canonical and what might not. And-as we
will discuss in Part 11-that is because fiduciary law has only recently
come to be understood as a field in its own right. Not so long ago, lawyers
and judges reasoned not in terms of broad fiduciary principles but in terms
of the more particularized expression given to them as matter of trust

fiduciary law, corporate fiduciary law, agency fiduciary law, and so on.
The "fiduciary canon" being, then, very much under construction, it is
difficult to say what works will with time be deemed to belong within it.
60

As recounted in the Book of Judges. Judges 9:7-20.
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However, one of the early landmarks in the development of the modern,
synthetic understanding of fiduciary law is Paul Finn's celebrated
Fiduciary Obligations.6' Finn was instrumental

understanding of the

field. 62

in shaping wider

And, conveniently for the fiduciary

constitutionalists who cite him approvingly, 63 Finn wrote several essays

advocating a fiduciary conception of government.r Affairs of state, Finn,
argued, are conducted on a kind of implicit public trust. And, he suggested
further, in understanding how public officials ought to act, we would do
well to think about the possible adaptation to public administration of
broadly fiduciary principles. 65 Thus, Finn articulated a fiduciary ideal of
government. It was one that he ruefully acknowledged is honored mostly
in the breach, but Finn maintained that it is implied by commitments to
popular sovereignty and representative government. 66

Finn has been celebrated as a model lawyer's lawyer and judge's
judge. 67 And, being partly responsible for the development of the modern,
synthetic understanding of fiduciary law, one should trust that his ideas
about the public law implications of fiduciary principles reflect a concern
to avoid distortion of private law. Thus, a claim to be taking up a project

61 Paul D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977).
62 See generally Finn's Law: An Australian Justice 1-2 (Tim Bonyhady ed., 2016); see also

Joshua Getzler, Fiduciary Principles in English Common Law, in The Oxford Handbook of
Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 471, 474 n.11 (referring to Finn's writings as one of the
"[l]eading treatments of the modem law"); Paul B. Miller, New Frontiers in Private Fiduciary
Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 891, 892 (referring to Finn's
Fiduciary Obligations as "of special importance" to the "development of fiduciary

scholarship").
63 Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 464 n.7 (listing Finn as a member of the fiduciary
constitutionalism "school"); Leib et al., supra note 1, at 703 n.14 (describing their own work,
and that of others, as but "a spin on Paul Finn's earlier insights.").

I

E.g., Paul Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, 38 Fed. L. Rev. 335 (2010) [hereinafter

Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries]; Paul Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability, 3

Griffith L. Rev. 224 (1994) [hereinafter Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability]; Paul
Finn, The Forgotten "Trust": The People and the State, in Equity: Issues and Trends 131
(Malcolm Cope ed., 1995).
65 Cf. Paul B. Miller, Principles of Public Fiduciary Administration, in Boundaries of State,

Boundaries of Rights 251, 251-70 (Tsvi Kahana & Anat Scolnicov eds., 2016) (highlighting
differences between private and public fiduciaries).
66 Paul Finn, A Sovereign People, A Public Trust, in 1 Essays on Law and Government 1,
14 (Paul D. Finn ed., 1995) ("[The] inexorable logic of popular sovereignty .... [is that] the
donees of... powers under our constitutional arrangements ... [are] the trustees, the

fiduciaries, of those powers for the people[.]").
67 Finn's Law, supra note 62, at 1-2.
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Finn started is, potentially, a powerful way of suggesting the fiduciary
bona fides of fiduciary constitutionalism.
But is fiduciary constitutionalism an extension of Finn's project? Did

his vision of fiduciary government sound in law or in political morality?
And to what extent did Finn contemplate the direct extension of fiduciary
duties from private law to public law? The answers: it is not an extension
of Finn's project, his vision sounds in political morality, and he did not
contemplate this direct extension of private fiduciary law to public law.
As we will explain, Finn thinks representative government is inherently
fiduciary in a legal-theoretical sense, but he does not suppose that
constitutions should be construed as fiduciary instruments. And Finn's
conception of fiduciary government, like that of his philosophical
forebears (including Locke), sounds normatively in political morality, not
in law. And Finn was quite explicit in saying that public fiduciary norms
are moral norms and are generally not expressed or otherwise
incorporated in justiciable standards of conduct of the sort that constrain
private fiduciaries.
In Finn's view, constitutions provide a skeletal structure for a system
of government-a system which will, as a matter of social reality and
political necessity, be developed within the constraints of a constitution
but in ways not determined by it. 68 In democratic systems of government,
constitutions enable and support a polity's aspiration to communal life on
terms of legality. Again, for Finn, the fiduciary ideal of government is not

primarily one that speaks to the text and structure of constitutions; rather,
it is an extension of the underlying political morality of representative
government that republicanism implies. For the fiduciary ideal to be
realized, three conditions must obtain within society and government:
(1) recognition of, and respect for, popular sovereignty; (2) recognition
that popular sovereignty implies representative government, and that
prerogative powers of the state thus belong properly to the people, to be

exercised on their behalf by public officials acting as public trustees (i.e.,
acting in a manner mindful of the representative nature of their offices);
and (3) recognition that public office, understood as a sui generis kind of
"trusteeship," implies that public officials must be accountable in some

68

Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability, supra note 64, at 226-27 ("[T]he skeletons

of our system of government which are our Constitutions are as notable for what they do not
say as for what they do.... [I]n the main they leave to assumption and inference the conditions

upon which public power is given to our officials and the rights and expectations which the
people are entitled to have both in and of the governmental system .... ").
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meaningful way to the public for the quality of the representation that they
provide. 69
Finn never suggested that constitutions are fiduciary instruments or that

they give rise to a fiduciary law of public office akin to that which applies
to private fiduciaries. In early work on the "bleak" question whether
public "trusteeship provides an outer limitation upon the uses to which
official power can be put," Finn noted that Australian law and politics had
yet to provide an "authoritative answer." 70 In addressing then-proposed

mechanisms for improving the accountability of public officials, Finn
considered electoral accountability, mechanisms for reducing partisanship generated by party politics, reform of offices of public ombudsmen
and auditors general, reform of the bicameral legislative system, and
improved internal supervisory systems within government bureaucracy. 71
In other words, he advocated structural reforms of an entirely familiar
sort, but did so for reasons of fiduciary political morality. He did not
advocate judicial enforcement of fiduciary duties or judicial review of the
validity of the exercise of public powers on fiduciary grounds.
In a recent reflection on the legacy of his work on fiduciary
government, Finn is quite explicit about its intended limits. Emphasizing

that his invocation of the fiduciary concept was largely metaphorical,
sounding in political morality rather than in law, Finn observed that "[t]he
aphorism-'nothing is so apt to mislead as a metaphor'-comes to life
here." 72 He emphasized that in "statutory settings we should be slow to

embrace expansively principles drawn from the law of trusts and from
fiduciary law so as to channel and control official decision making."7 3 We
should be reluctant to draw on fiduciary law because: the robustness of
extant principles of statutory construction and practices of judicial review
"render resort to trust and fiduciary law for grounds of review largely
unnecessary"; judicial review on fiduciary grounds would raise new
concerns about democratic legitimacy and institutional competence; and
it is "unlikely that the characterisation of the State as a trustee of its
powers of government for the people . .. will provide workable criteria
upon which to found judicial review of official decision making." 74 He
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 232-33.
71 Id. at 238-41.
72 Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, supra note 64, at 339.
73 Id. at 335.
69
70

74

Id.at 336.
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concludes that juridification of the ideal of fiduciary government is "an
unnecessary distraction." 5
II. DISTORTIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW
Fiduciary constitutionalists support a fiduciary conception of
government as a matter of legal construction (specifically, of the U.S.
Constitution). One could take the more modest position, approving of a
fiduciary conception of government as a matter of political morality.
Indeed, one of us has elsewhere endorsed a thin conception of fiduciary
government animated by a set of broad principles of political morality
that are entailments of the representative character of democratic
government. 76 That prior work aims to curb some of the excesses wrought
by recent enthusiasm for the idea of fiduciary government. It emphasizes
that fiduciary political morality is relatively normatively thin and modest
in its scope of application.77 In articulating broad principles of fiduciary
political morality, it also emphasizes that much fiduciary doctrine
familiar to private lawyers is simply inapt to public administration-to
the extent that public law is responsive to fiduciary principles, it takes a

doctrinal form that is unique to public law, and in many (most) cases the
uptake and enforcement of these norms is left to politics.
While doubtlessly wellzintentioned, fiduciary constitutionalism
demonstrates the aptness of Finn's observation that "nothing is so apt to
mislead as a metaphor." 7 8 In this Part, we show how the allure of the
75 Id. at 350-51; see also the comments of Australian High Court Justice Stephen Gageler
in his commentary on Finn's legacy in Stephen Gageler, The Equitable Duty of Loyalty in
Public Office, in Finn's Law, supra note 62, at 131 ("Finn cautiously drew back from
suggesting that either legislative or executive power ... were to be radically re-conceived as

being held on some form ofjudicially enforceable social trust. A suggestion of that kind would
have been in direct opposition to the overwhelming popular commitment to democratic

processes of self-government which had led to the establishment of representative and
responsible government in the Australian colonies .... ").
76 Paul B. Miller, Political (Dis)Trust and Fiduciary Government at 223, 227, 241, in
Fiduciaries and Trust: Ethics, Politics, Economics and Law (Paul B. Miller & Matthew

Harding eds., 2020); Paul B. Miller, Fiduciary Representation, in Fiduciary Government,
supra note 48, at 28, 45, 47-48.
77 Paul B. Miller, Political (Dis)Trust and Fiduciary Government at 223, 227, 241, in

Fiduciaries and Trust: Ethics, Politics, Economics and Law (Paul B. Miller & Matthew
Harding eds., 2020); see also Paul B. Miller, Fiduciary Representation, in Fiduciary
Government, supra note 48, at 28, 45, 47, 48. For criticism, see Evan Fox-Decent, Challenges

To Public Fiduciary Theory: An Assessment, in Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law 379,
379 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018).
78 Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, supra note 64, at 339.
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metaphor has misled the fiduciary constitutionalists in how they describe
fiduciary law.
A. The (Relative) Modernity of FiduciaryLaw

One of the most puzzling things about fiduciary constitutionalism is
that it invokes a relatively new set of legal constructs to explain a very
old legal document-the U.S. Constitution-and what its drafters and
ratifiers understood it to accomplish. It is now possible, and increasingly
common, to talk of fiduciary law as a unitary field: one organized around
a few core concepts. 79 The credit for that goes to pioneers like Finn, along
with Deborah DeMott, 80 Tamar Frankel,8 1 Gordon Smith,82 and, more
recently, a wider cast of scholars who have provided synthetic accounts
of the field. 83 But, while fiduciary law is now a recognizable field in its
own right, this is a thoroughly modern development. Indeed, it has taken
place only within the last fifty years.
If one were to ask a nineteenth-century lawyer about "fiduciary law"
and its significance for our understanding of constitutions, constitutionalism, or representative government, one would likely be met with
expressions of bafflement. Our hypothetical jurist might simply reply by
asking, "What do you mean by fiduciary law?" Or, perhaps, "Do you
mean trust law?"84

79 See generally Part II: A Conceptual Synthesis of Fiduciary Law, in The Oxford Handbook
of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 367 (referring to fiduciary law as a unitary field).
80 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke
L.J. 879, 879, 880 (discussing the "law of fiduciary obligation" as a field).
81 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 795, 797 (1983) (recognizing "the law
that governs [fiduciaries] as a distinct body of policies, principles, and rules").
82 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 Vand. L. Rev.
1399, 1400 (2002) (crafting a "unified theory of fiduciary duty").
83 See especially the work collected in Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) and The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law,
supra note 1.
84 Indeed, this posture is reflected in a rich and venerable line of Commonwealth cases-

beginning with Kinloch v. Secretary of State for India, [1882] 7 App. Cas. 619 (HL) 625-26
(appeal taken from Eng.)-which rejects the notion that public officials are trustees in an
ordinary sense and, sticking with the specific category of fiduciary relationship that had been
invoked by litigants, suggests that public officials should instead be deemed fiduciaries in a
"higher"-which is to say, moral-sense.
See also the discussion in Gageler, supra note 75, at 128-29 ("The Court of Chancery did

not ... impose all of the equitable obligations of a trustee on holders of public office merely
because they might be described as 'having ... a public duty to perform'.... Thus, in 1882,
Lord Chancellor Selbome was able to distinguish between two distinct kinds of trusts. The
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The difficulty is that fiduciary constitutionalism trades on the modern,
synthetic understanding of fiduciary law and what are now understood to
be its core concepts. Thus, fiduciary constitutionalists invoke the concept

of "fiduciary power" in describing in very general terms the "fiduciary
relationship[s]" entailed by government. 85 Likewise, they appeal to
generic "fiduciary duties" including a "duty of loyalty" and "duty of care"
in analyzing constraints on the exercise of powers attached to public

offices, in analyzing the text of the U.S. Constitution, and in analyzing
the role-related obligations of officials in various branches of government
in upholding the Constitution. 86
By the light of modern fiduciary law, the invocation of these concepts
is perfectly intelligible. But it would have been foreign to an eighteenthcentury lawyer precisely because legal thought had not yet achieved a
synthetic understanding of fiduciary law. Lawyers of times long gonefrom ancient Greece and Rome to eighteenth-century Philadelphia-

would have been familiar with features of the legal landscape that are now
analyzed synthetically in fiduciary terms. For example, they clearly were
aware of, and preoccupied with, relationships of representation, trust, and
fidelity. But that does not allow one to read back into history the
conceptual and doctrinal apparatus of a recently synthesized body of law.
Thus, in summary, one way-arguably the key way-in which

fiduciary constitutionalism distorts fiduciary law is by presenting it
anachronistically. Fiduciary constitutionalists find fiduciary concepts at
work during a period in which the concepts had not yet crystallized. These

concepts could not then have been operative in the minds of lawyers and
politicians, much less in their efforts to translate competing visions of

republican government into the text of the Constitution.

first were trusts in the 'lower sense,' being in respect of 'matters which are the proper subject
of equitable jurisdiction to administer'. The second were trusts in the 'higher sense', 'such as
might take place between the Crown and public officers discharging ... duties or functions
belonging to the prerogative and authority of the Crown'. The first were 'within the
jurisdiction of and to be administered by the ordinary Courts of Equity'. The second were not.
Trusts of that second kind could be labelled 'political trusts'." (footnotes omitted)).
85 See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85

Denv. U. L. Rev. 201, 206 (2007); Leib & Galoob, supra note 47, at 1825.
86 See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 130-31; Leib & Galoob, supra note 47, at
Robert G. Natelson, The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from

1846-47;

the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 191, 211-32 (2001).
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B. Methods ofIdentifying FiduciaryRelationships

Consistent with our concern about the ahistorical invocation of
fiduciary concepts is a related concern with the way in which fiduciary
constitutionalists place a fiduciary construction on the Constitution. As
we shall explain, the manner of construction does not align with thenprevailing, and still-dominant, methods of identifying fiduciary
relationships.

Fiduciary constitutionalists deploy different strategies-sometimes in
combination-in supporting the claim that the U.S. Constitution founds a
fiduciary relationship between the U.S. government and American
citizens. 87 One is to argue that the relationship meets a formal definition
of the fiduciary relationship, drawing on modern fiduciary law or
theory.88 Another is to argue that the relationship has several of the
characteristics of recognized fiduciary relationships-power, discretion,
trust, inequality, or vulnerability-and so may be considered fiduciary on
that basis. 89 A third is to argue by analogy to any of a number of
recognized categories of private fiduciary relationship, suggesting that the

87 Although much of the literature will straightforwardly say that the Constitution is, or
should be treated as if it were, a fiduciary instrument, the claims in the Harvard article of
Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, and Jed Shugerman are more nuanced. They often sound in
analogy. E.g., Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2192 ("But our findings here at least suggest that

the President-by original design-is supposed to be like a fiduciary .... "). But sometimes
not. They expressly claim to be offering a "fiduciary reading," id. at 2112, 2188, and "fiduciary
theory," id. at 2178, 2182, of Article II. This ambiguity, or partial but prudent reticence, can

be seen in two sentences in the introduction:
We do not claim that the drafters at Philadelphia took ready-made fiduciary law off the
shelf and wrote it into Article II. But we do assert that the best historical understanding

of the meaning of the Faithful Execution Clauses is that they impose duties that we
today-and some in the eighteenth century as well-would call fiduciary.

Id. at 2119. Kent, Leib, and Shugerman also refer to "the fiduciary obligations entailed by the
Faithful Execution Clauses." Id. at 2181 (concluding that "the project of fiduciary
constitutionalism" is not "misguided," but that it needs revision because the president's
fiduciary obligations "flow at least as much from the law of public office as they do from
inchoate private fiduciary law from England"); see also id. at 2190 & n.470 (concluding that
"our effort here is not to develop clear rules of constitutional law[,]" while also endorsing "the

finding of a fiduciary duty of loyalty in the Faithful Execution Clauses" and finding that "the
Constitution clearly imposes this set of fiduciary obligations on the President in Article II").
88 Leib et al., supra note 1, at 705; Leib & Galoob, supra note 47, at 1825-26; Gary Lawson
& Guy I. Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government's

Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 1385, 1386 (2017).
89 Leib et al., supra note

1,

at 706.
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strength of the analogy supports the construction. 90 A final strategy is to
treat the relationship as an instantiation of a single category of private
fiduciary relationship-a power of attorney, express trust, or relationship
of agency. 9 1

These strategies of argument are innocuous if the purpose is developing
a normative political theory, and so one's aim is simply to show how as a
matter of political morality democratic government may be viewed as
fiduciary. Political theory draws on other legal constructs-notably,
contract-in a metaphorical sense in order to illuminate and address core
normative problems of government. But it is another thing to suggest, as

the fiduciary constitutionalists do, that these strategies support a fiduciary
construction of the Constitution as a matter of law.92 Each strategy is
incapable of bearing that weight because each ignores established
methods of constituting and identifying fiduciary relationships.
The kind of construction that some fiduciary constitutionalists wish to
place on the Constitution and American government-i.e., one according

to which its fiduciary nature is fixed and inherent, and was recognized as
such at the Founding-is unsupported by then-prevailing law on the

formation and identification of fiduciary relationships. Consistent with
the relative modernity of fiduciary law, until recently courts had not
developed or operationalized a general concept of the "fiduciary

relationship." Thus, courts from the eighteenth century until the late
twentieth century did not examine a particular relationship, or general
category of relationship, and deem it "fiduciary." Rather, the prevailing
approach was to recognize categories of actor or relationship as

presumptively subject to duties that we now construe as fiduciary. 93
Under this status-based method of identifying fiduciary relationships,
everything (as a matter of law) turns on the existence and weight of legal
authority for the fiduciary construal of a given category of actor or
90 Id. at 712-13 (defending their efforts at "translation" from private to public law by means
of analogy); Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1090 (drawing
an analogy between trustees and government officials for the purpose of establishing that the
latter are subject to a duty of impartiality).
91 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 3-5 (comparing the Constitution to a power-ofattorney relationship); id. at 112 (discussing relationship of agency); Natelson, The
Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1086-87.
92 Some readers will not follow us in distinguishing between political morality and
constitutional law; to the extent that one integrates political morality and constitutional law,

this criticism holds less force.
93 Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary Relationships, in The Oxford Handbook
of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 367, 370-73.
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relationship. 94 Courts now sometimes say that status-based fiduciary
relationships merit categorical status because they are "inherently"
fiduciary. 95 But for most of its history, fiduciary law did not develop from
a shared understanding of the characteristics that make a relationship
fiduciary; nor were attributions of fiduciary status based on judicial
consensus that these characteristics "inhered in" a given kind of
relationship. 96 The law instead worked with settled judgements that
certain kinds of relationship were apt for the imposition of duties of
loyalty and care.
Because fiduciary constitutionalists are making a claim of general
fiduciary status in their construal of American government under the
Constitution, they face an immediate and insuperable obstacle in
convincing the lawyer and judge that they have a legal basis for that
claim. A lawyer or judge would rightly ask: in what line of cases, or in
what piece of legislation, have lawmakers announced or attributed general
fiduciary status to the office(s) or relationship(s)? It will not be enough to
make vague allusions to ambiguous language (e.g., of trust or fidelity).
Settled attributions of fiduciary status are settled precisely because they
have been made clear and unambiguous over time. All of which is just to
say that, if one wants to argue that the Constitution and the offices or
relationships established under it are fiduciary as a matter of law, there is
no escaping the demand for clear and compelling authority for that
proposition. Fiduciary constitutionalists do not furnish this authority
because they cannot; it is not there. If it were, we would be living under
fiduciary constitutionalism and not just debating it as a theoretical matter.
We have said enough about legal arguments that should have been
made, but tellingly have not been made, by fiduciary constitutionalists. In
light of the foregoing, we can now briefly point out the flaws in each of
the four strategies of argument that they have used.

94 Id.; see also Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in Fiduciary Law, in Contract, Status, and

Fiduciary Law 25, 35-36 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) (explaining that
fiduciary status automatically applies to certain relationships and courts tend not to question
this fiduciary characterization).
95 See, e.g., French v. First Union Sec., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 818, 825 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)
(finding that "the investor-stockbroker relationship is an inherently fiduciary relationship").
96

Miller, supra note 93, at 368-69, 371, 373 ("Over time, fiduciary law has come to

encompass an increasing number of kinds of relationship to which authoritative attributions
of fiduciary status have been made.... Additionally or alternatively, various kinds of

relationship are declared fiduciary as a matter of judge-made law.").
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First, general definitions of fiduciary relationships are a feature of
modern fiduciary law, but they were not operational in the law at the
Founding, and so provide no basis for the claim that the Founders
intended to form, or were understood by the ratifiers to have succeeded in
forming, fiduciary government in a legal sense under the Constitution. 97
Second, resort to isolated relationship characteristics (e.g., power,
discretion, trust, vulnerability) in identifying fiduciary relationships is
also a feature of modern fiduciary law; it is a methodology that would
have been unknown to the Founders and is, in any event, inapt because it
is used to support ad hoc identification of fiduciary relationships. 9 8
Third, reliance on analogies to support the fiduciary construction of a

legal relationship had, under then-prevailing law, no weight save as
channeled through status-based identification of fiduciary relationships
and, as we have already established, there is no authority for that
attribution having been made of American government at or near the
Founding.
Fourth and finally, the suggestion that the Constitution is fiduciary in

the sense that it instantiates an already recognized type of fiduciary
mandate or relationship-for example, a trust or power of attorney-fails
for the reason that it is unsupportable analytically (being reductive and
distorting of the nature of the Constitution as a legal instrument) and
historically (being unrecognized at law as an actual trust, power of

attorney, etc.). If it is objected that these familiar fiduciary relationships
were meant to have been invoked in a metaphorical rather than literal
sense, our point will have been conceded.
C. The (Limited) FiduciarySignificance of Mechanismsfor Conferring
FiduciaryMandates

One of the core attractions of fiduciary constitutionalism for its
proponents is the thought that it provides resources for alternative
interpretations of constitutional text. So, consider now the question of
what one can infer about the legal character of mechanisms by which
91 Davis, supra note 7, at 1150 ("[I]t is far from clear that fiduciary government was a
background understanding of legal rights at the Founding. When the Founders raised the
theory of fiduciary government, they often did so in connection with politicalmechanismschiefly impeachment and elections-for holding government officials responsible for
breaches of the public trust.").
98 See Miller, supra note 93, at 373-74; Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based

Fiduciary Relationships, in The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 3, 6-11.
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fiduciaries receive their mandates from the fact that the mechanism is just
that-i.e., a legally effective means by which to confer a fiduciary
mandate. How are these mechanisms interpreted and constructed as a
matter of judicial practice?
Judging by the fiduciary constitutionalists, one would think that if a
mechanism confers fiduciary powers, that fact is the central and defining
feature of the mechanism, such that it is to be interpreted or constructed
as fiduciary in a thorough-going way, and not just a means by which a
fiduciary relationship might be formed. That is the implication of the

refrain that the Constitution must be understood as a "fiduciary
instrument,"9 9 and of comparisons drawn between it and trust deeds,
corporate charters, and powers of attorney. The "recognition" that the
Constitution establishes and confers "fiduciary" powers on governmental
institutions and offices is thought to invite, and indeed, to license,
sweeping fiduciary reinterpretation of much of the text.
The problem is that this move is unsupported by judicial practice in the
interpretation and construction of fiduciary mandates. Private fiduciaries
receive mandates by different mechanisms of authorization. Some receive
them under a contract of employment, agency agreement, or consent

document. Others are granted fiduciary powers under a will, trust deed,
or power of attorney. Still others are invested with fiduciary powers by
statute (e.g., one that enables, establishes uniform law for, or regularizes
a given kind of fiduciary relationship, organization, or institution). Not
infrequently, several mechanisms are jointly implicated in the conferral
of a given mandate on a fiduciary, and together define its objects and
specify terms relating to fiduciary administration.1 00 Each can generate
problems of interpretation and construction. A familiar problem in trust
law, for example, is that of determining whether language used by a
settlor in a trust deed results in the conferral of a trust power (to be
exercised subject to fiduciary constraints) or a bare power (which need
not be exercised at all), and the difficulty of distinguishing instructions
(which, amongst other things, limit the exercise of trust powers) and
expression of the settlor's wishes (which may, but need not, be taken into

&

9 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1, at 20; Natelson, supra note 34, at 281; Leib
Shugerman, supra note 1, at 477.
100 Consider, for example, the combined effect of a statute of incorporation, a corporation's
articles of incorporation, and agency-related provisions of an employment contract between
the corporation and its officers on the mandates wielded by corporate officers relative to a
corporation and its shareholders.
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account by the trustee). Are all issues of interpretation and construction
of trust deeds, agency contracts, medical consent forms, statutes of
incorporation and the like resolved by courts through a "fiduciary" lens,
on the basis that the instrument confers a fiduciary mandate? Again, the
answer is no.

Instruments that are legally effective mechanisms for conferring
fiduciary powers do other things, including positing or transferring non-

fiduciary powers, rights, duties, privileges, and liabilities, and providing
for the creation of an institution, organization, relationship, or transaction

that has non-fiduciary as well as fiduciary incidents. Because a given
instrument can define non-fiduciary as well as fiduciary facets of a
relationship, it is not correct to suggest that all of its terms are to be given
a fiduciary interpretation because it is a "fiduciary instrument." A difficult
question often arises as to whether a given term-normally, a power-

should be interpreted as fiduciary or otherwise, and the question cannot
be resolved by urging that it appears in a "fiduciary instrument" (i.e., one
which provides for powers that are plainly fiduciary). Rather, the non-

fiduciary terms of the instrument will fall to be interpreted and
constructed in the usual way, with attention to the language used and its
possible meaning(s), the structure of the instrument, the intentions of the
parties, and so on.
An implication is that even if the Constitution could be viewed as
conferring certain powers on fiduciary terms as a matter of black-letter
law, that would not license wholesale fiduciary re-imagining of the text
in the manner that some fiduciary constitutionalists have supposed. And

that, in turn, means a limited return on investment for the fiduciary
constitutionalist: the fiduciary frame of analysis cannot, after all,
legitimately be taken to resolve longstanding questions of constitutional
interpretation and construction.10 1 Just as we sometimes struggle mightily
with difficult questions of interpretation or construction of a will or trust
deed-questions that admit of no easy or completely satisfactory answer,
and so may be seedbeds of disagreement-so too we have struggled to
parse vague and ambiguous language in the Constitution.10 2 A fiduciary

theory of the U.S. Constitution offers no principled way around these
difficulties.

101 See Davis, supra note 7, at 1169.

102 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1835, 1836 (2016).
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D. Good Faith in FiduciaryLaw

Fiduciary constitutionalists make much of the amorphous concept of
"good faith" in supporting a fiduciary construction of the Constitution
(especially Article II).103 Again there is variation among fiduciary

constitutionalists, but generally the concept is used in two ways.
First, some fiduciary constitutionalists point to constitutional language
indicating expectations of fidelity or good faith, and conclude that the
Founders understood the Constitution to be a "fiduciary instrument." 10 4
Thus, the language of good faith is treated as diagnostic of the existence
of a fiduciary relationship, or set of relationships, at the core of American
government.

Second, many fiduciary constitutionalists suggest that expectations of
good faith, held by the Founders and expressed in the Constitution, have
specific normative entailments. Among them: that the Constitution gives
rise to "fiduciary duties," including a duty of good faith, that constrain the
attitude(s) and behavior of public officers in the exercise of official
powers and performance of governmental functions. 105 Thus, a public
official whose attitude toward the Constitution is one of apparent hostility
or indifference, or whose behavior reveals a privileging of self over office
or country, is said to violate a constitutional-fiduciary duty of good faith.
As David Pozen has shown, one of the difficulties with the invocation
of good faith in constitutional law and politics lies in deciphering its legal
meaning(s) and differentiating it from its valence in political discourse.' 06
As a legal concept, good faith is amorphous precisely because it is
invoked in a variety of different contexts to signify substantively different
expectations of persons acting independently or as parties to a relationship

or collective endeavor. Good faith means one thing in respect of the
performance of contracts, something else in respect of the exercise of
property rights (e.g., in "spite" cases), and something else again in tort

law (e.g., in the law of defamation) and in fiduciary law. And that is just

103 E.g., Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2112, 2118, 2178-79, 2190; Barnett & Bernick, supra
note 1, at 6, 25, 30, 37. Note that Kent, Leib, and Shugerman describe the President as being
"like a fiduciary," rather than as actually being a fiduciary. Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2192.

Yet they also conclude that the President has "fiduciary obligations," id. at 2119, and they
describe their own work as providing a "'fiduciary' reading," id. at 2112, and "[f]iduciary
[t]heory" of Article II, id. at 2178. For discussion, see supra note 87.
' Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2119, 2179.
05

See Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2112, 2118, 2178-79, 2 190.

06 See generally David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (2016).

2020]

Against FiduciaryConstitutionalism

1507

private law. There is no reason to suppose less variegation in public law,
or that constitutional and other modalities of public ordering simply
"borrow as found" one of the varieties of good faith found in private law.
Added to this complexity are other challenges generated by the distinctive
import of good faith in American political culture. As Pozen acutely
observes, self-serving claims of fidelity to constitution and country are
routine in contemporary politics, as are mudslinging allegations of badfaith disregard for the common weal. 107 Pozen points out that, judging by
the jurisprudence, good faith has had surprisingly little impact on
constitutional interpretation and adjudication. 108 And this should be

unsurprising when one considers that casual assertions of good faith and
allegations of bad faith have (sadly) become background noise in
contemporary politics.

None of this should be viewed as particularly auspicious by those who
would base a fiduciary theory of the Constitution in part on language of
good faith in and surrounding it. Pozen's work-which does not draw any
"fiduciary" implication one way or another-suggests that notions of

good faith, at least at present, fail to supply neutral standards of right
conduct for public officials.1 09 He shows how one might recover the
concept and locate clear attitudinal and behavioral standards within it. 1 0
But that seems, perhaps now more than ever, a utopian project.

Setting to one side macro issues generated by the unsettled place of
good faith in law and politics, does experience with the concept of good
faith in fiduciary law support the two core uses to which the concept has

been put by fiduciary constitutionalists? It does not.
First, the use of language that states an expectation of good faith should
not be treated as diagnostic of the presence of a fiduciary relationship in
fiduciary law.'" And for good reason: expectations of good faith are
pervasive in social life. Some of these expectations resonate entirely as a

107

Id. at 887, 918-21, 925, 929-39.

08

Id. at 918 (noting that "judges have frequently ignored constitutional bad faith").
10 Id. at 944-47.
110 Id. at 951-54.
" A similar point can be made about Lawson and Seidman's faulting Caleb Nelson for not
"recognizing [the] agency-law moorings" of the doctrine that a principal power contains
within it incidental powers. Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 91. But the doctrine has no

such moorings. It does appear in agency law, but also in a wide variety of contractual settings.
See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, "Necessary and Proper" and "Cruel and Unusual": Hendiadys in

the Constitution, 102 Va. L. Rev. 687, 757-58 (2016) (discussing incidental powers in the
context of a tenancy at will).
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matter of personal or political morality. Others, as we have noted earlier,
are recognized at law. But the expectations, and the recognition given to
them, vary widely. Again: some jurisdictions recognize a general duty of
good faith in contract law, or a special duty of good faith (or utmost good
faith) in some relational contracts; property law responds to injurious acts
of owners that are notionally taken within their rights, but in bad faith, in
spite cases; tort law makes inquiry into the fides of alleged tortfeasors in

certain contexts, as it does under qualified privilege and fair comment
defenses to liability for defamation. And we have not even come to
fiduciary law. We will say more about good faith in fiduciary law in a
moment.
But one

can already

appreciate why language

expressing

an

expectation of good faith is not treated as diagnostic of fiduciary
relationships by courts.m'2 These expectations are ignored, and properly

so, because their pervasiveness makes it difficult to determine their upshot
as pretext for legal categorization of particulars (particular acts,
interactions, or relationships on which litigation is focused): again, we
have expectations of good faith in relation to all manner of social
interactions with others, and questions concerning what those
expectations connote, whether they are reasonable, and whether and how
they should be recognized at law, can only be answered in a contextsensitive way after a decision has been made about categorization of
conduct that has been put in issue before a court.
Turning to the question of the normative content of the concept of good
faith in fiduciary law by way of addressing the second use to which "good
faith" is put by fiduciary constitutionalists, we are again confronted with
the wider problem of the ahistorical invocation of legal concepts. Did
lawyers at the Founding understand "good faith" to have distinctive
meaning-and thus, potentially, normative content or effect-as a general
"fiduciary" construct? There is no evidence that they did. And it would
be surprising to learn otherwise because here, in contrast to other
fiduciary concepts (e.g., the fiduciary relationship, or duty of loyalty),
synthetic interpretation is still very much in flux. There continues to be

debate whether there is such a thing as a general fiduciary concept of good
faith, and if so, what it requires of fiduciaries or signifies about rightful

112

Accord Khan & Pozen, supra note 7, at 523 (recognizing that "all parties involved in all

contracts" are required to "act in good faith toward each other[,]" and so the existence of a

good-faith requirement does not prove the existence of a fiduciary relationship).
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conduct or wrongdoing by a fiduciary." 3 Even in corporate law, where
the concept has received more attention than elsewhere, it has been
unclear whether good faith is a fiduciary norm, and if so whether it is
properly to be understood as independent or a mere entailment of the duty
of loyalty." 4
What does this mean for the claims that a fiduciary notion of good faith
grounded in the Constitution constrains the construction of powers
devolved by it, and amounts further to a fiduciary duty conditioning the
exercise of these powers? As to the former, it would be a mistake to think
that "fiduciary good faith" is a settled concept that has a bearing on the
interpretation and construction of powers conferred by the Constitution.

If, notwithstanding the cautionary notes we have sounded above, it is
meaningful as a matter of modern law to talk of "fiduciary good faith" at
all, it is as a constraint on the exercise of fiduciary powers. That is, good
faith is a norm for the guidance of fiduciaries in the performance of their
mandates, not for personal or judicial interpretation of same. 15 But, and
this brings us to the latter claim, modern fiduciary law does not yet
support the invocation of a general fiduciary duty of good faith, and so by
implication does not permit one to make broad statements about whether
the conduct of public officials exemplifies "fiduciary" bad faith. Of
course, consistent with Pozen's analysis, one can advance arguments
"3

See, e.g., Richard Nolan & Matthew Conaglen, Good Faith: What Does It Mean for

Fiduciaries, and What Does It Tell Us About Them?, in Exploring Private Law 319, 319-32
(Elise Bant & Matthew Harding eds., 2010) (explaining a general fiduciary duty of good faith
unique to the fiduciary context); see also Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty in

The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 385, 390-91 (claiming that a duty
of good faith in the fiduciary context does exist as well as fiduciary loyalty); James Penner,
Fiduciary Law and Moral Norms, in The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1,

at 782, 786-87 (describing how the application of the good faith standard operates in the form
of "fiduciary loyalty").
"4 See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456, 494-95 (2004);
David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A
Contractarian Approach, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 491, 493-95 (2004); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 30 (2006); Mariana Pargendler,
Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties Reconsidered, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1315,

1316-17 (2008); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?,
83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1257-67 (2010); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's Core Demand:
The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629, 691 (2010) (referring
to "the debate about whether there was a free-standing 'fiduciary duty of good faith' distinct
from the duty of loyalty").
"1
Notice that the suggestion otherwise is circular: the suggestion being that to the extent
that one has been invested with a fiduciary power, a norm of good faith controls the construal
of any and all other powers one might have received under a "fiduciary instrument."
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about what counts as constitutional bad faith as a matter of political
morality. But here, too, fiduciary constitutionalism will have been
brought against the will of its proponents to meet with its destiny as a
critical normative theory sounding in political morality, untethered from
fiduciary law.
E. Misstating the Nature andAmbit of FiduciaryObligation

Fiduciary constitutionalists have argued that understanding the U.S.
Constitution as a "fiduciary instrument" enables one to identify a suite of
public "fiduciary duties" including, but extending well beyond, the "duty
of good faith" discussed above. 1 6 We underscore that these duties are
presented as having a legal (not merely moral) and fiduciary nature (rather
than, say, being norms enforced by regulation, criminal law, or the
discipline of politics). Thus, the emphasis on the similarity between
public and private "fiduciary" duties.' As we will explain, many of the
claims that fiduciary constitutionalists make about public "fiduciary
duties" misrepresent or ignore important features of the law on the nature,
ambit, and enforcement of fiduciary duties.
On the nature of fiduciary duties, we again find an example of
ahistorical invocation of fiduciary law. Fiduciary constitutionalists speak
in broad terms of generic fiduciary duties-of loyalty, care, candor, good
faith, obedience, and non-delegation-without noticing that this involves
reading back into history constructs that did not exist at the Founding and,
in some cases, for centuries afterward. As is true of the generic concept
of a "fiduciary relationship," generic formulations of fiduciary duties are
an achievement of the synthetic analysis that has shaped modern fiduciary
law.118 Unsynthesized fiduciary law-the proper reference point for any

fiduciary constitutionalism that is rooted in text, history, and structure
knew not generic fiduciary duties but rather particular duties imposed on
particular actors whom we now call fiduciaries: duties of loyalty and care
of trustees, of directors,of agents, and so on. Adjusting for history means
that the frame of analysis apt to fiduciary constitutionalism is a level
down: reference should be made to the duties of trustees, directors, agents,
and guardians (and, consistent with fiduciary constitutionalism's
116 See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 47 (identifying a "duty to account," a
"duty of loyalty," a "duty to follow instructions," and a duty to "stay within the scope of
granted authority").
117

Supra note 90.

118

See generally The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1.
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emphasis on the Founding, the starting point might be on these duties as
they stood in late eighteenth-century law).
The difference in historical frame of reference is, again, one that makes
a difference to the plausibility of fiduciary constitutionalism. First, the
standards of conduct through which "fiduciary" duties were expressed
and enforced differed significantly between and across categories of
relationship.1 19 Second, courts did not invoke a generic conception of the
duties or associated standards. Thus, iffiduciary constitutionalists were to
be able to locate fiduciary duties in the Constitution they would have to
do so by construing it as generating a fiduciary mandate of a particular
eighteenth-century type (e.g., a trust, corporation, or power of attorney)

and show that notwithstanding obvious objections 120 some or all of the
duties attachedto that type apply to public officials.
Turn now to the scope of fiduciary

obligation. The fiduciary

constitutionalism literature gives an impression of breadth-the number
and extent of fiduciary duties is extensive. But how many distinctively
fiduciary duties are there? The question is difficult to answer because
here, too, learned opinion is unsettled. 121 Some think that there is only one
fiduciary duty: that of loyalty.1 22 American law and scholarship
recognizes one more: the duty of care. 123 Any other claim as to the
fiduciary character of a duty sometimes-even frequently-imposed on

fiduciaries lands one in controversy. So here too, the claims of fiduciary

119 For comparative historical assessment of the duty of loyalty in trust law and corporate
law, see John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best

Interest?, 114 Yale L.J. 929, 959-62 (2005).
120 For example, that the object of public fiduciary administration is government as such,
rather than a particular matter of administration of another person or another person's
property.
121 Cf. Davis, supra note 7, at 1149 (noting indeterminacy in fiduciary law, and that
"[i]mporting fiduciary law into constitutional and administrative law carries this
indeterminacy with it"); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 McGill L.J. 235,

281-86 (2011) (charting the indeterminacy in fiduciary law); see generally Velasco, supra
note 114 (canvassing the debate in corporate law).
122 Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of NonFiduciary Duties 59-60 (2010); see also Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of

Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 Law Q.R. 452, 452 (2005).
123 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Fiduciary Duty ofCare, in The Oxford Handbook
of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 405, 406-07; see also Joshua Getzler, Duty of Care, in
Breach of Trust 41, 41-42 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds., 2002); Christopher M. Bruner,
Is the Corporate Director's Duty of Care a "Fiduciary" Duty? Does it Matter?, 48 Wake Forest

L. Rev. 1027, 1028 (2013) (noting the uniqueness of the U.S. approach compared to other
common law jurisdictions).
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constitutionalism skate across thin ice. There is, notably, little indication
of doctrinal or scholarly support for the characterization of some of the
referenced duties as fiduciary, including the "duty to follow
instructions"124 and the "duty of non-delegation."' 25
F. The Enforcement of FiduciaryDuties and Remedial Regimes

We turn finally to enforcement. If the Constitution gives rise to
fiduciary duties, how are those duties enforced? That is, who has standing
to enforce them, how, and in what forum; and in what ways are judges to
give effect to the duties through remedies or otherwise? It is telling that
fiduciary constitutionalists have little to say about these questions. 126 And
not just because there is no evidence of enforcement of fiduciary duties
grounded in the Constitution. It is because, even if for argument's sake
one were to suppose that the Constitution generates fiduciary-like duties,
the claim that they are fiduciary in the sense familiar to private law is
belied by the fact they are not amenable to enforcement by civil suit.
Other accounts of fiduciary government that view fiduciary norms as
principles of political morality (including Finn's) can and do point out
that these norms are instantiated other than by "fiduciary law" (e.g., in
public service regulations on conflicts of interest and, especially, in tort
and criminal liability for corruption, breach of trust, and misfeasance in a
public office).12 ' But because fiduciary constitutionalists insist that the
124

See, e.g., Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1137-42

(describing the debates around the "duty to follow instructions" in writing the constitution);
Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending, supra note 34, at 255-57 (defining the
"duty to follow instructions").
125 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 107-29; see also Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1,

at 477-84.
126 See, e.g., Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 485-89 (raising, but not answering other
than in a speculative way, questions about what fiduciary constitutionalism implies for

remedies); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 88, at 1393 (raising the issue of enforcement
mechanisms and then leaving the question "to another day"); Natelson, supra note 34, at 281-

82 (avoiding questions of specific remedies in discussing fiduciary constitutionalism).
127

Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, supra note 64, at 337 n.16 (describing actions in

tort for deceit, misfeasance and non-feasance in public office, and observing that recourse lay
in law rather than equity). On tort and criminal liability, see generally Robert J. Sadler,

Liability for Misfeasance in a Public Office, 14 Sydney L. Rev. 137 (1992) (exploring the role
of the tort of misfeasance for actions of public officials); Richard Harwood, Criminal
Misconduct in a Public Office, 4 J. Fin. Crime 172 (1996) (describing the different treatment
criminal law gives to private citizens and those in public positions of trust); Mark Aronson,

Misfeasance in Public Office: A Very Peculiar Tort, 35 Melb. U. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (describing
the uniqueness of misfeasance in public office amongst common law torts); Donal Nolan, A
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Constitution gives rise to "fiduciary duties" that have much in common
with private law fiduciary duties, 128 questions of enforcement are hard to
avoid.
Even so, it is not easy for fiduciary constitutionalists to answer such
questions, for several reasons. Most germane to fiduciary law is the
inconvenient fact that the modern, synthetic understanding of fiduciary
law has yet to filter down to enforcement. Causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty are almost always channeled through the primary body of
substantive law that applies to the fiduciary. Thus, for example, corporate

directors are sued for breach of fiduciary duty in accordance with
prevailing legislation (the statute under which the entity was
incorporated). The same is true of trustees, agents and other fiduciaries.

One cannot circumvent the doctrinal "silos" of fiduciary status in seeking
enforcement of a fiduciary duty, save and unless-as is inapt here-one
does so by claiming to be in an ad hoc fiduciary relationship.
The enforcement question can be further developed with respect to
remedies. Although some fiduciary constitutionalists take no position on
remedies, others make plentiful suggestions. For example, Kent, Leib,
and Shugerman, while not committing themselves to any particular

remedial regime for the U.S. Constitution, nevertheless say about English
and American practice over a broad swathe of centuries: "the enforcement
mechanisms we found for commands of faithful execution run the gamut
from judicial enforcement via damages, fines, injunctions, bond
forfeiture, and criminal penalties, to impeachment and removal from
office."1 29 Of course, this remedial smorgasbord was not, and is not,
available for any single kind of fiduciary relationship (and Kent, Leib,
and Shugerman do not suggest the contrary).

Public Law Tort: Understanding Misfeasance in Public Office, in Private Law and Power 177

(Kit Barker et al. eds., 2017) (defining the tort of misfeasance in public office as within the
realm of public law and discussing analogous concepts).
128 See, e.g., Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2188 ("Our findings vindicate what we have
previously called the 'fiduciary reading . . . of Article II' because the three major propositions

we identify as the substantive original meaning of faithful execution-a subordination of the
President to the laws, barring ultra vires action; a no-self-dealing restriction; and a requirement
of affirmative diligence and good faith-taken together reflect fundamental obligations that

are imposed upon fiduciaries of all kinds." (quoting Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib & Jed
Shugerman, Self-Pardons, Constitutional History, and Article II, Take Care Blog
(June 16, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/self-pardons-constitutional-history-and-

article-ii [https://perma.cc/S5JW-7FGJ])).
129 Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2120.
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Recall that the Constitution is variously said to establish a trust, an
agency relationship, or a grant of a power of attorney. But each of these
kinds of mandate or relationship had different remedial structures in 1789.
And even a presentist focus on contemporary fiduciary law does not solve
the problem-today, in 2020, liability is routed through different remedial
structures. There is no body of pan-fiduciary remedies to which the
fiduciary constitutionalists can appeal. A critical explanation is the
different remedial structures of law and equity, including for the
categories of fiduciary relationship that grow of out of equity or out of
law. Consider, for example, the paradigms of trust and agency.
The remedial structure of contemporary agency law has been described
this way:
Agency was developed primarily by the courts of law, not the courts of
equity. This background has shaped the remedies in agency law in
important ways. Consider three.
First, because principals and third parties could sue agents at law,
there have traditionally been juries in agency, and these juries couldas is typical with legal claims-award punitive damages. There is thus
no controversy about punitive damages in agency. Nor is there any
doubt about whether a legal restitutionary remedy is available against
an agent.
Second, agency tends to put more emphasis on self-help remedies.
In recounting a principal's remedies against an agent, Deborah DeMott
begins with self-help: "For starters, the self-help response of
terminating the relationship with the agent may prove wise, regardless
of its legal aftermath." That response makes sense in the agency
context, because the principal tends to be present, uncowed, and able to
assert control. Self-help plays a smaller role in equity, which has a long
history of helping those who could not help themselves, including
beneficiaries who have been cheated by fiduciaries and remain at their
mercy.
Third, while trust law was shaped more by suits by beneficiaries
against trustees, agency law was shaped more by suits by third parties
against principals for the acts of their agents. That difference in the
paradigm case meant that for agency the concern was less with
performing duties (the perspective of the principal), and more with
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allocating losses (the perspective of the injured third party). And losses,
of course, are a central concern of tort law.
Agents tend not to have deep pockets. The central question has
therefore been the liability of the principal. Thus attention was given,
early and often, to the circumstances in which a third party could obtain
punitive damages against a principal for the acts of an agent.
Because the remedial concerns of agency have tended to align with
those of tort, it is unsurprising that agency tends to outsource the
development of its remedial principles. Thus the Restatement (Third)
of Agency speaks the language of fiduciary duties, yet those duties do
not shape the available remedies to the same extent as in trust law and
in fiduciary law more generally. Instead that Restatement looks to the
law of tort and the law of restitution to determine the basis for its
remedies. 130
At each one of these points the remedial structure of contemporary trust

law is completely different. Trust law was developed in equity."' There
is no jury for a suit alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee, 132 and
the traditional position is that in trust law there are no punitive damages
and no punishments.1 33 By contrast, what are available are specifically
equitable remedies such as accounting for profits, equitable
compensation, and constructive trust.

34

Self-help is minimal-instead,

judicial enforcement is much more central, including the courts' exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction over trustees. 3

5

And the paradigm case is not

130 Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra
note 1, at 449, 460-61 (quoting Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in
The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 23, 38) (footnotes omitted).
'3' See Sir John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 215 (5th ed. 2019)
(including the trust among equity's "permanent additions to the law which survived the

abolition of" the Court of Chancery); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":
The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
1317, 1320 (2003) ("The trust remedy tradition grew up in equity and remains, in the words
of the Restatement of Trusts, 'exclusively equitable."' (quoting Restatement (Second) of

Trusts

§ 197 (1959))).

132 See Samuel L. Bray, Equity and the Seventh Amendment 22 (February

1, 2019)

(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
133 See Samuel L. Bray, Punitive Damages Against Trustees?, in Research Handbook on
Fiduciary Law, supra note 77, at 201, 202 ("The rule is that punitive damages are not available
against trustees, with an exception for 'the egregious case."' (quoting the Restatement (Third)

of Trusts

§ 100 cmt. d (2003))).

134 See Bray, supra note

135

Id. at 460.

130, at 451-58.
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a suit by a third-party, but rather a suit by (or on behalf of) a victimized
beneficiary. 136 In short, "fiduciary law" contains quite different remedial
structures: the equitable structure of trust law and the legal structure of
agency law.

The fiduciary constitutionalists recognize the importance of remedies
to their project. But they are also unwilling to be pinned down.

Lawson and Seidman, for example, note the limitations on suits against
the Crown 137 and shy away from confronting the question of what
remedies are available to enforce the fiduciary duties they find in the
Constitution.1 38 Leib and Shugerman are similarly reticent to commit. In
a recent article they spend several pages discussing possible remedies for
a violation of fiduciary duty by the President, including approaches they
call "literalist," "analogical," and "translational."1 39 They recognize room
for creativity and development in the remedies for those who think the
Constitution is "like" a fiduciary document or should be translated as a
fiduciary document. For the literalist, though, they offer a list. They say:
"Public fiduciary duties, then, can have straightforward (and literal)
juridical applications with fairly conventional remedies one would see in
the private law: constructive trusts, accounting, injunctions, and damages
with a view to disgorgement." 4 0 Even so, Leib and Shugerman are

unwilling to be pinned down, and they end their discussion of remedies
with this note of hesitation: "This isn't the place to perfect the design of
remedies for public fiduciary default. That conversation will surely get
richer as the project of fiduciary constitutionalism continues after Lawson
and Seidman's contribution to this important enterprise." 14 1
Because there are different remedial regimes for different kinds of
fiduciary relationships, the question of remedy cannot be separated and
postponed. Indeed, this failure to identify a remedial regime has upstream
136 Cf. id. at 461 ("Self-help plays a smaller role in equity, which has a long history of
helping those who could not help themselves, including beneficiaries who have been cheated
by fiduciaries and remain at their mercy.").
137 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 133.

138 Id. at 133-34 ("We do not need to decide here whether, for example, a writ of mandamus
will properly lie against the president. It is enough for us to say that the president is not above
the law and to move on, leaving questions of enforcement mechanisms (if any) to another

day.").

139

See Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 485.
14 Id. at 487.

141 Id. at 489; see also Leib & Kent, supra note 1 (manuscript at 6 n.15) (including among
the remedies for violations of a public trust "impeachments, forfeitures of office, fines,

accountings, and other approaches to enforcement").
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consequences for the identification of the fiduciary relationship. If the
Constitution did establish determinate fiduciary duties of a kind already
known to the law, these would entail similarly known remedies. But if the
remedies are unclear, there is further reason to doubt the existence of a
fiduciary relationship in the first place.
III. DISTORTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Some

claims

about

the

Constitution

present

themselves

as

illuminations-they help us understand what we have been doing all

along. Others present themselves as changes of course-they help us see
that we should be doing things differently. The modern claims of
fiduciary constitutionalism are primarily of the latter sort. If the fiduciary
constitutionalists are right, there are newly unearthed duties for
government officers-duties sounding in law, and not only in political
morality.
This Part considers two of these claims. The first is that the text of the
Constitution expressly incorporates fiduciary concepts; the second is that
the structure of the Constitution taken as a whole reinforces that it is a
fiduciary instrument. This Part also tests these claims as a matter of
constitutional tradition-if the Constitution were understood at the
Founding as a fiduciary instrument giving rise to legally enforceable
fiduciary duties, one would expect those duties to have been enforced.
Why were they not enforced and not noticed in the mainstream of the
constitutional tradition? Even as we make these critiques, we wish to

underscore the pluralism within fiduciary constitutionalism: fiduciary
on interpretive
constitutionalists have different perspectives
their historical
about
confidence
of
degrees
methodology, different
reconstructions, and different views on how easily one can move from the
law of 1789 to the law of today.
A. Claims About the Constitution

A core claim of fiduciary constitutionalism is that the U.S.
Constitution, not just as interpreted now but as understood in its original
context, is fiduciary in a juridical sense. "The Constitution is a fiduciary
instrument," according to Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, "and that
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characterization carries interpretative consequences in its wake."1 42
Others, such as Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, and Jed Shugerman do not say
the Constitution was a fiduciary instrument, but they still say that Article
II should be given a "fiduciary reading." 43 The bases for such conclusions
are standard sources and modalities of constitutional interpretation. These
include the text, the historical context in which it was adopted (including
legal backdrops"), antecedents such as state constitutions and colonial
charters, and the structure of the document as a whole. The reliance on
these sources suggests a kind of interpretive normalcy, supporting the

notion that the claims of the fiduciary constitutionalists are unoriginal.'14
With respect to the text of the Constitution, the fiduciary
constitutionalists have taken two tacks. The first is to focus on specific
words or phrases that are said to have a fiduciary connotation. An example
is the work of Leib and colleagues. They point to the appearance of the
word faith and its cognates in the Constitution and presidential oath of
office.1 46 The President is required to "faithfully execute" the office of
President and take care that the laws of the United States are "faithfully
executed."1 47 These requirements are subtly different (active versus
142 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 11. On the qualifications Lawson and Seidman

make, and the tension between those qualifications and the impetus of the argument, see
Primus, supra note 7, at 400, 402-04; see also Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1, at 20 ("The
Constitution's structure and content disclose its character as a fiduciary instrument."); Leib et
al., supra note 1, at 709 ("The founding generation understood the relationship between
government and governed as a fiduciary one-and those who debated and ultimately adopted
the Constitution assumed that it would promote fiduciary standards, controlling the political
discretion of officeholders.... The Constitution was therefore designed as 'the fiduciary law
of public power,' delimiting governmental authority and directing it to the benefit of the
citizen-beneficiaries." (quoting Frankel, supra note 33, at 279)); Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota,
& David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1109, 1122

(2014) ("The founders of the United States . . . also recognized the relevance of fiduciary
principles as applied to the public political sphere. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution was thought
to be designed as the fiduciary law of public power, delimiting governmental authority and
directing it to the benefit of citizen-beneficiaries." (footnotes omitted)).
143 For discussion, see supra note 87; see also Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President
May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause,

4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 107, 117 (2009) ("I suggest the President is a holder of an
Article VI public trust-a public fiduciary.").
'] See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1813,

1816 (2012) (describing backdrops as "rules of law that aren't derivable from the
Constitution's text, but instead are left unaltered by the text, and in fact are protected by the
text from various kinds of legal change").
4 E.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 7 ("[W]e make no claim to originality.").

146 Leib & Shugerman, supra note
141 U.S Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id.

1, at 465-69.
§ 3.
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passive voice, different objects), and they are susceptible of various
readings. 148 But they are regarded by Leib and colleagues as indicating
the Founders' understanding that the presidency is a fiduciary office and
that the President's duty to execute the laws is a fiduciary one.1 49
The second tack is to focus is on the substantive meaning of a
provision, with the suggestion that it evokes or replicates familiar
fiduciary norms. An example is the work of Natelson, writing alone and
with others, on the Equal Protection Clause. The language in the clause is
not quasi-fiduciary. But, Natelson and colleagues offer, it is most
plausibly interpreted as fiduciary insofar as it resonates with a general
fiduciary norm of impartiality-a norm that, in private law, requires even-

handedness in the administration of property for the benefit of multiple
beneficiaries.15 0 Similarity in the content of a constitutional norm and a
fiduciary norm are, then, offered as evidence that the Founders intended
the Constitution to be treated as a "fiduciary instrument."
Proponents of fiduciary constitutionalism also highlight the "fiduciary"
language in the constitutions of colonies and states that preceded the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution. For example, Natelson notes that
royal charters establishing U.S. colonies devolved authority on colonial
government "on trust," and that the constitutions of Maryland and other
148

On the Take Care Clause, see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The

President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994); Goldsmith & Manning,
supra note 102; John Harrison, Executive Power (June 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors); Kent et al., supra note 1; see generally Michael W. McConnell, The
President Who Would Not Be King: Executive Power Under the Constitution (forthcoming
2020) (on file with authors); Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 167 U.

Pa. L. Rev. 1269 (2020).
49 Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at 466 ("Where does this locution about 'faithful
execution' come from? The language of 'faith' feels like no accident: the concept flows from
the Latin fiducia-meaning faith or trust-the root of the word for the private law
fiduciary. ... The kind of constraints 'faithful execution' imposes turn out to look a lot like
what we would say today are core fiduciary obligations ... [and, after cautioning that 'faithful
execution' is an element of a 'law of public office' rather than a fiduciary principle per se,
they continue:] there are reasons to see the constraints of 'faithful execution' as of a piece with
core fiduciary obligations that attach to private law relationships."); Kent et al., supra note 1,
at 2112 (referring to theirs as a "'fiduciary' reading of the original meaning of the Faithful
Execution Clauses"); id. at 2119 ("[T]he best historical understanding of the meaning of the
Faithful Execution Clauses is that they impose duties that we today-and some in the
eighteenth century as well-would call fiduciary.").

"I Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of
Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 415, 435-36 (2014); see also Natelson, The
Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1150-58 (analyzing the duty of
impartiality).
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states refer to various public officials as "trustees of the public." 15 1
Lawson and Seidman note that the Massachusetts constitution of 1780
called all legislative, executive, and judicial officers the "substitutes and
agents" of the people, while the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 called
legislative and executive officers the people's "trustees and servants.""'
It is suggested, therefore, that colonial charters and state constitutions
were model fiduciary constitutions upon which the Founders drew in
developing the U.S. Constitution.' 53

As for the writings and recorded statements of the Founders, again
fiduciary constitutionalists place considerable emphasis on the use of
varied "fiduciary" words and phrases such as trust, faith, guardian,
trustee, and power of attorney. According to Natelson, this language

indicates that the Founders, inspired by the political theory canon 154 and
the text of various state constitutions, wanted to realize an "ideal [of
fiduciary government] with real-world legal implications." 5 5
Indeed, Natelson thinks the Founders envisioned no less than five
"fiduciary duties" for public officials. First, their concern that the U.S.
Constitution be adhered to is offered as evidence that they intended a
fiduciary "duty to follow instructions," realized through provision for
limited powers and the Constitution's assertion of its own supremacy.1 56
Second, their concern that the Constitution be fulfilled through prudent
administration is offered as support for a fiduciary "duty of reasonable
care," reflected textually in minimum age and residency requirements for
151 Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note

1,

at 1135 (quoting Md.

Const. of 1776, art. IV).
"I Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting Mass. Const. of 1780, part I, art. 5; Pa.
Const. of 1776, ch. 1, § IV). Lawson and Seidman also cite constitutional provisions of
Maryland and Vermont. Id. (quoting Md. Const. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, § IV; Vt.
Const. of 1777, ch. I, § V). Note that the language in these state constitutions does not support
the conclusion that they establish judicially enforceable fiduciary duties. First, because the
language often invokes different legal regimes-e.g., "trustees and servants"-it is not easily
understood as importing substantive and remedial law from one of those regimes. Second, the

scholars appealing to these state constitutions have not shown the logical corollary of their
conclusions, namely a practice in the state courts of interpreting these provisions as imposing

justiciable fiduciary duties.
" Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1135-36. Lawson and
Seidman note the absence of any similar fiduciary provisions in the U.S. Constitution, but
consider such provisions to merely be "stat[ing] the obvious," and so "no great consequences
flow from their presence or absence." Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 44-45.

1 See infra Section I.A.

155 Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1136-37.

156 Id. at 1137-41.
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legislators and the President, as well as in the presidential veto power over
legislation.15 7 Third, the concern that public officials demonstrate loyalty
to our Constitution and country is furnished as proof that the Constitution
was understood by its ratifiers as imposing a fiduciary "duty of loyalty,"
reflected textually in U.S. citizenship and residency requirements for the
President and members of Congress. 15 8 Fourth, the concern to ensure that
Americans are treated as equals before the law is said to suggest that the
Founders intended a fiduciary "duty of impartiality," reflected textually
in rules mandating total numbers and proportionality of representation
within the House and formal equality in the allocation of Senate seats to
the states. 159 Fifth, and finally, the concern over the accountability of
public officials is said to indicate that the Constitution was understood to
impose a fiduciary "duty to account," reflected textually in the provision
made for regular elections, the swearing of oaths, and liability to
impeachment and removal from office. 160
In claiming that the Constitution should be understood as "fiduciary,"
the fiduciary constitutionalists are quite clear about their methodological
premises. They are working broadly from text and structure as understood
at the Founding. 16 ' Their claims are not that a fiduciary reading of the

Constitution is the best as a matter of political morality (in the manner of
Ronald Dworkin), 162 nor are they arguing that that the Constitution is

becoming or should become a fiduciary text through common law
development and elaboration (in the manner of David Strauss). 163 Rather,

Id. at 1137, 1142-45.
Id. at 1137, 1146-48.
1'9 Id. at 1150-56.
"0 Id. at 1137, 1159-66.
161 Some fiduciary constitutionalists, such as Gary Lawson, are committed originalists. For
'57

58

some others, originalist premises are perhaps adopted arguendo or in order to seek common
ground among a wide variety of interpretive approaches. Compare Lawson & Seidman, supra
note 1, at 6-8 (noting originalist views), with Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2116-17, 2192
(framing inquiry into "the original meaning of Article II"), and Leib & Shugerman, supra note
1, at 485 (suggesting that their argument shows "how rich an enterprise [fiduciary

constitutionalism] can be for originalists and non-originalists alike"). For discussion by
Lawson and Seidman about how their "modular project" can be used by those with a range of
interpretive views, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Authors' Response: An Enquiry
Concerning Constitutional Understanding, 17 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 491, 502-03 (2019).

162 E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
163

E.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev.

877 (1996).
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they are arguing that the text, understood in its original context, is the
basis for fiduciary constitutionalism.' 16
B. Critiquing the ConstitutionalClaims

The claims made by the fiduciary constitutionalists rest especially on
text, structure, and history. A common problem for these claims is a
failure to agree on what kind of fiduciary document the Constitution is.
As noted above, to some fiduciary constitutionalists it is best thought of
as a power of attorney, to others a trust, to others an agency relationship,
and to others a generic fiduciary instrument (as if there were such a
thing).1 65 Some (but only some) of the fiduciary constitutionalists appear
to treat that disagreement as inconsequential.1 66 But it is a problem for the
constitutional argument, for it makes it harder to connect the textual
references to fiduciary duties that have a defined shape. A pattern of loose
association and analogies is, however, exactly what one would expect if
the fiduciary claims were rhetorical, rather than legal.
1. Text: The Linguistic Problem

One textual technique of the fiduciary constitutionalists is pervasive.
They find a word or phrase in the Constitution, and then they find that
word or phrase in one or more fiduciary contexts. On the basis of this
association, they bring trappings of how the word is used in the fiduciary
context to the Constitution.' 67 To be fair, this is not the sole basis for the

1" For the most part, the fiduciary constitutionalist literature does not commit itself to a
particular form of originalism. But see Barnett & Bernick, supra note 1. Nevertheless, the
orientation toward original understanding is very pronounced. See, e.g., Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 1; Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2116-17 (describing their article as "the first
substantial effort to pursue the historical origins of the twin commands of faithful execution
and to link these findings to the original meaning of Article II," and while noting that they are
not taking positions on methodological disputes, suggesting that their illumination of "original
textual meaning" is useful for many kinds of constitutional interpretation (footnote omitted));

id. at 2120-21, 2178-80 (reaching conclusions about the "original meaning" of Article II); id.
at 2192 (concluding their article with these words: "Now that this original meaning is more
clear, the Constitution can be applied more faithfully to the vision of the framers.").

165 See supra notes 8-1l and accompanying text.

166 E.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 62 ("The fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee
and an attorney do not differ in any way material to our project.").
167 By the figure of speech metalepsis, the writer of a text can use a word or phrase that
brings with it a larger context, especially from a canonical work. If a person leaving on a trip
says "Of arms and the man I sing," she may be communicating to her listener a large set of
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claims of the fiduciary constitutionalists-they also rely on structural
features of the Constitution that are said to resemble the structure of a
fiduciary mandate or instrument. That argument is taken up below. But
the textual arguments tend to have this pattern: this word or phrase is used
in fiduciary contexts; ergo it is "fiduciary."

The basic technique in this argument from linguistic association is
flawed. It is not illuminating to say that "x word is used in fiduciary
contexts" unless we know the denominator. The words and and but are
frequently used in fiduciary contexts. But no one would think to say that
they are therefore "fiduciary." Although that is a reductio, the same point

can be made about a number of the textual snippets that are relied on by
the fiduciary constitutionalists.
In their recent article Faithful Execution and Article II,168 Kent, Leib,
and Shugerman adduce a substantial amount of evidence that many
holders of offices throughout English and American history were
compelled to swear oaths, and that one characteristic of these oaths was a
requirement of "faithful execution." The exact wording varied-e.g.,
"well and faithfully perform their offices"' 6 9 -but the pattern is amply
demonstrated. Yet there are problems when they move from the historical
examples to adduce their constitutional significance.
First, their evidence of undertakings of faithful execution in connection
with offices runs far beyond offices to which legally enforceable
"fiduciary" duties attach. Their evidence shows a requirement of faithful
execution for everyone from medieval coroners17 0 to seventeenth-century
surveyors' 7 1 and curates1 72 to fence-viewers in colonial Connecticut.17 3

These persons all had important, public-facing duties, and they needed to
perform them well. Their oaths impressed that upon them.

74

But they

were not fiduciaries.

Odyssey-related meanings. But the interpreter bears the burden of argument. On metalepsis,

see Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Gospels 10-12 (2016).
168

Kent et al., supra note 1.

169 Id. at 2149 n.214 (quoting The Spanish Company 95, 106 (Pauline Croft ed., 1973)).
170 Id. at 2142.
171 Id. at 2149-50.
172 Id. at 2172.

13 Id. at 2166-67.
174 Nathan S. Chapman, Constructing the Original Scope of Constitutional Rights, 88
Fordham L. Rev. Online 46, 58 (2019) ("Whatever else the oath may do, it at least has the

possibility to uniquely pique the decision-maker's conscience .... ").
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Consider another example (one not given by Kent, Leib, and
Shugerman): the antecedent of the modern London cabbie. In 1761, the
coronation of King George III was expected to bring massive crowds into

the city, and the Privy Council gave orders "to Hackney Coachmen and
Chairmen, for regulating their attendance and fares on the day of the
Coronation."1 75 There had apparently been an agreement by the hackney
coachmen and chairmen to raise their fares on Coronation Day. In
response,
the Lords of the Privy Council not only ordered that such persons
should be out with their Coaches and Chairs by four o'clock in the
morning, but that their duty should be faithfully performed without any
advance in their demands, under pain of being proceeded against with
the utmost severity. 7 6

That a duty should be "faithfully performed" is exactly the sort of
command that is fastened upon by Kent, Leib, and Shugerman. Yet the

coachmen and chairmen were not bound by the law of trusts or of agency.
They were not legally accountable as fiduciaries.
Second, Kent, Leib, and Shugerman glide between reference and sense,
between association and meaning. At the conclusion of part of their
historical survey they offer a section called "Summing Up." They say:
"This period was also consistent in showing that faithful execution was
often tied to staying within authority and abiding by the law, following
the intent of the lawgiver, and eschewing self-dealing and financial
corruption."' 77 True, but "was often tied to" is an argument about
associations, about the company that this word keeps. In the next sentence

they say: "This tripartite meaning of faithful execution is consistent for
both English and colonial office-holding."17 8 That is a non sequitur. It is

175 A Faithful Account of the Processions and Ceremonies Observed in the Coronation of
the Kings and Queens of England: Exemplified in that of Their Late Most Sacred Majesties
King George the Third, and Queen Charlotte: With All the Other Interesting Proceedings
Connected with that Magnificent Festival 35 (Richard Thomson ed., 1820).
176 Id. at 35-36 n.*.
177

Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2169 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at

2118 ("[F]aithful execution was repeatedly associatedin statutes and other legal documents
with true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, and impartial execution of law or

office." (emphasis added)).
178 Id. at 2169 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2146 ("In reviewing a large number of oaths,

we paid careful attention to which words and concepts were frequently associated with faithful
execution in statutes, commissions, and similar documents, and cross-referenced those

findings with dictionaries to help define faithful execution." (emphasis added)).
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a confusion of meaning and association. And it will not work across the
breadth of examples that the authors' account is meant to encompass. It
also will not work for the Coronation Day coachmen and chairmen-yes,
they were prohibited from enriching themselves by using "surge pricing,"
so there is some resonance with fiduciary constraints in the bare fact of
their being prevented from profiteering. But this is a minimal and
uninstructive point of association. The coachmen and chairmen were not
subject to any definite fiduciary norm. They were not subject to a norm
against self-dealing; a coachman could choose to prefer his cousin over
another

passenger

without

any

requirement

of public-regarding

motivation. The coachmen and chairmen were not being warned against
ultra vires actions.

Now our point is not that the President or any other officer of the United
States is like a coachman or a coroner. Nor do we mean to suggest that
there is any moral justification or excuse for presidential self-dealing or
ultra vires action. The point is that Kent, Leib, and Shugerman are taking
a command that is used in fiduciary contexts and then drawing the
conclusion that it is a reliable marker (at least today) of fiduciary contexts.
But the fact that it is also used in contexts that are indisputably not
fiduciary means it is not necessarily such a marker.
Nor can an association of a word with certain things yield the
conclusion that it means those things. Their "tripartite meaning" of

"faithfully execute" is unsound. "Faithful execution" can have different
resonances, including the resonances implicit in their "tripartite
meaning." But words do not have a kind of enumerated polysemy that is
invulnerable to context. A phrase like "faithful execution" will take on
the color of its surroundings, because what is faithful depends on what is

faithless, and that will vary somewhat from office to office, and from
century to century. The specification of a fixed tripartite meaning for
"faithful execution" when it appears in "a legal instrument (such as
Article II)"179 is implausible.
At this point it is worth noting some critical qualifications that Kent,

Leib, and Shugerman make. They concede that the Constitution does not
cross-reference or incorporate an existing body of fiduciary law. 180 As
they put it, "[o]ur historical account does not suggest that private fiduciary

law was the background for Article II or that it was incorporated by

179 Id. at 2178.
1 0 Id. at 2119.
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reference."' 81 Therefore, to connect their findings about "the law of
offices" with fiduciary law, they rely on resemblance with today's
fiduciary law.' 82 As noted earlier, they also carefully avoid taking a
position on how the "fiduciary" duties of the President should be
enforced. That reluctance may seem odd, but it is entirely understandable.
They cite many parallels to executive officers having to "take care" (e.g.,
executives after independence in Vermont, New York, and Pennsylvania,

and in colonial Pennsylvania from the 1680s' 83), and to swear oaths
requiring faithful execution (e.g., 1636 Pilgrim Code of Law for New
Plymouth, Fundamental Orders of Connecticut of 1639184). But they cite
no examples of breach of these undertakings being made a basis for
liability in civil suits. Of course, civil suits are the chief mechanism of
fiduciary accountability in modern law. So once again there is a
disjuncture between what their Founding-era sources support and what
obtains doctrinally and analytically under modern fiduciary law.
What is striking, then, is the disconnect between (1) the rich history

that Kent, Leib, and Shugerman present about the incidence of faithful
execution, especially in oaths of office; and (2) the meager links between
that history and the idea that the President is a fiduciary. We find that rich
history compelling, and think it should orient our understanding of the
executive power toward a concept of faithfulness that is ethical as well as
practical. Moreover, Kent, Leib, and Shugerman's article is more skillful
than other fiduciary constitutionalist histories in recognizing change over

time, including their recognition that what we now call "fiduciary law"
did not exist as such in 1789. But they nevertheless draw fiduciary
implications from their evidence about offices; despite their concessions

181 Id. at 2180. Their attempts to tie English trust law to public law in one footnote are
entirely speculative: "Lord Chancellor King, who wrote the Keech opinion, was surely

influenced by an earlier impeachment trial over which he had presided.. .. Lord Chancellor
King is very likely to have been fluent in the political theory of John Locke, his cousin and
routine correspondent .... " Id. at 2180 n.410.
182 Id. at 2179 ("Our historical findings about the original meaning of the Faithful Execution

Clauses align with core features of modernfiduciary law .... "(emphasis added)); id. at 218182 ("Today, we might very well call such a mix of empowerment with office and subordination
to principal or purpose fiduciary, reinforcing another dimension of the fiduciary theory of
Article II." (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)).

18 Id. at 2135; see also id. at 2160 (quoting The Charter of Massachusetts Bay (1629),
reprinted in 3 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws
of the States, Territories, and Colonies 1846, 1852 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909)).
184

Id. at 2161.

2020]

Against FiduciaryConstitutionalism

1527

about private fiduciary law not even being background for Article II,185
they repeatedly suggest that the President is a fiduciary. 86
In short, there are certain recurring distortions of constitutional law in
fiduciary constitutionalism. One is an interpretive error, taking
associations as if they were meanings. This can be seen as an overaggressiveness in finding terms of art, or as a misuse of the figure of

speech metalepsis.1 87 This error finds in the constitutional text more
certainty, more closure, than it can really provide.1 88

Another distortion is the forcing of constitutional history into presentday doctrinal categories. It may be that the fiduciary constitutionalists can

argue persuasively that we should "translate" what Kent, Leib, and
Shugerman call the law of offices into present-day fiduciary language.
Indeed, Leib and Galoob have helpfully isolated a looser, "translational"
approach to fiduciary political theory. 189 But that is not the project of
Lawson and Seidman, and it is not the project of Kent, Leib, and

Shugerman in their joint article. Instead, they aim to tell us what the
Constitution means by telling us what the Constitution meant. But
fiduciary constitutionalism, whatever its attractions as normative political
theory, is not a reliable guide to the original meaning of the Constitution.
It is a presentist distortion.

Id. at 2180.
186 Id. at 2119 ("[T]he Faithful Execution Clauses are substantial textual and historical
commitments to what we would today call fiduciary obligations of the President."); id. at 2120
("Our history supports readings of Article II of the Constitution that limit Presidents to
exercise their power only when it is motivated in the public interest rather than in their private
self-interest, consistent with fiduciary obligation in the private law."); id. at. 2190 ("[T]he
finding of a fiduciary duty of loyalty in the Faithful Execution Clauses is an important
'8s

development .... "); id. at 2191 ("[T]he President, like all fiduciaries, has significant
discretion . . . . to promote the best interests of the people, the ultimate beneficiaries of his
fiduciary obligation .... ").
187 On metalepsis, see supra note 167 and accompanying text.
188 On the Supreme Court's unwillingness to date to answer foundational questions about

the Take Care Clause, see Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 102, at 1853-59.
189 See generally Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, The Core of Fiduciary Political
Theory, in Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law, supra note 77, at 401, 414. Leib has shown
interest in this more cautious way of developing a fiduciary theory of government in other
work. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary

&

Principles into Public Law, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 91 (2013); Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet,
Michael Serota, Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in Philosophical Foundations of
Fiduciary Law, supra note 83, at 388.
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2. Structure: The Genre-QuestProblem

The fiduciary constitutionalists also make claims about the structure of
the Constitution, namely that it has structural affinities with various kinds
of fiduciary instruments, and thus that it is-or more cautiously, can be
read as if it were-a fiduciary instrument. The essential quest is one of
classification. The fiduciary constitutionalists are offering a claim about
"[c]ategorizing the Constitution."190 The thought is that if we can only
find out what kind of text the Constitution is, then we will know how to
read it.
Behind this aspiration is an intuition about the importance of genre in
interpretation. But there is an important limitation on genre analysis.

Where there are well-established genres, to which authors feel the need
to conform, it can be helpful for interpretation to identify the genre. If we
understand the sonnet form and know that the author is part of a
community in which there was strong adherence to the form, then we can
favor an interpretation in which line nine marks a turning point over one
in which the turn would come in line ten.
But genre identification is least helpful when a text is sui generis, and
when multiple different genres can be plausibly asserted, not because the
text is all these different things but because it is none of them. That is true
to a remarkable extent for the Constitution. Richard Primus has put this
point well in his critique of Lawson and Seidman's book on fiduciary
constitutionalism:
Lawson and Seidman recognize that the analogy between the
Constitution and powers of attorney is imperfect. They contend,
however, that the Constitution is in substance more analogous to a
power of attorney than to any other sort of legal instrument. I am not
sure that is right. But even if it were, it would be a fallacy to insist that
the Constitution should be interpreted as if it were some other sort of
legal instrument to which it is analogous, rather than admitting the
possibility that [the] Constitution should be interpreted in the specific
and distinctive way appropriate for the specific and distinctive kind of
law that it is. As Bishop Butler taught, every thing is what it is, and not
some other thing.' 91

190 That is the title of chapter four of Lawson & Seidman, supra note 1, at 49.
191

Primus, supra note 7, at 388 (footnotes omitted).
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When a text does not fit into pre-existing genre categories, one can play

with all the points of contact, but it will not produce interpretive closure.
The genre identification itself will do no work. Each point of similarity
will have to be argued out, and it will then stand for whatever it has been
shown to be-neither more nor less simply because this point (and not
other points) is held in common with some particular genre. And that is

true here: because the fiduciary constitutionalists admit, in their careful
moments, that their genre identifications are incomplete and imperfect,
they cannot carry more weight than their underlying proof.192 Overlap
with texts in a genre is not enough to bring a text into the genre.

C. The Constitutional-TraditionProblem
The Founders invoked different kinds of fiduciary categories when
characterizing public office; Natelson's work shows that they mentioned
agency, trusteeship, guardianship, and the power of attorney. And some

of the Founders had a sophisticated understanding of law.1 93 They knew
what agency, trusteeship, guardianship, and the like consisted of. They
thus knew that as a legal matter these positions were understood
differently in law and equity. The nature of the respective mandates of the
trustee, agent, and guardian, the mechanisms by which those mandates
are constituted, and the powers and objects normally specified for them
all varied (and still vary) significantly. Recognizing this, what should one
gather from the fact that the Founders referred interchangeably to agents,
trustees, and guardians? If the Founders did think the proposed
Constitution imposed legally enforceable fiduciary duties, how would
that have affected the ratification debates? After ratification, what should
we expect to find if the Founding generation thought the Constitution was
a fiduciary instrument? And how would the fiduciary concept recur
throughout the central debates of our constitutional tradition?
One place to look is not only the ratification debates, but also the major

constitutional controversies in the first decade of the new country.
Richard Primus has noted that the claims of Lawson and Seidman about
192 For example, Lawson and Seidman concede that "[t]he U.S. Constitution rather plainly
does not look exactly like an eighteenth-century power of attorney," Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 1, at 49, and they admit that the dissimilarities "do cabin somewhat the kinds of
claims" they can make, id. at 55.

193 A leading example is James Wilson, whose legal practice is summarized in William
Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 901, 904-14
(2008).
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the fiduciary Constitution are belied by a void where all of the
contemporaneous debate should be. This is so in the debate at
ratification,'

94

and as Primus shows it is also true in the subsequent

decade: in all of the major constitutional controversies of the 1790s, the
fiduciary Constitution is missing in action.195
The same point can be made about the claims of Kent, Leib, and
Shugerman. In their own words, in the ratification debates "the disputes
were mild with regard to the components of Article II central to our
project."' 96 But the disputes would not have been mild if the proposal had
been that the President and other federal officers had fiduciary duties,
particularly if they were enforceable by courts. 197 If any such enforceable
duties were an innovation-as they would have been, given the lack of
any such suits against the king or the state governors-would they not

have drawn remark? Would supporters of ratification not have wanted to
point to this fact, in order to allay fears about the new executive? And
would supporters of a strong national government not have had concern
that state equity courts could entertain claims against the President, and

even supervise the President in his performance of his duties, just as they
supervised trustees? If not, why not?
When we move past the Founding generation, it is remarkable how
little support the fiduciary constitutionalists have found in our
constitutional tradition. Consider, for example, Joseph Story. If the
fiduciary constitutionalists are right, then Justice Story's treatises-some
of the most learned and certainly some of the most influential in
nineteenth-century America-should tell the tale. He wrote the leading
194

See Primus, supra note 7, at 388-96; see also John Mikhail, Is the Constitution a Power
&

of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commentary on "A Great Power of Attorney":
Understandingthe FiduciaryConstitution by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, 17 Geo. J.L.

Pub. Pol'y 407, 414-15 (2019).
195

Primus, supra note 7, at 396-98; see also Sherry, supra note 14, at 452 ("Lawson and

Seidman omit any mention of the history of what the Founding generation did once the
Constitution was ratified and the federal government began operations.").
196

Kent et al., supra note 1, at 2123.

197

Kent, Leib, and Shugerman do not commit to any particular non-impeachment
enforcement-they say "[w]e do not opine here on the way the framers envisioned enforcing

the President's duty of loyalty and avoiding self-dealing." Id. at 2190 (emphasis added). But
other work by two of the authors is not so reticent. See Leib & Shugerman, supra note 1, at
486-87 (claiming that there is "plenty of caselaw" supporting "straightforward judicial

remedies for breaches of public fiduciary obligations" and claiming that "[p]ublic fiduciary
duties . . .can have straightforward (and literal) juridical applications with fairly conventional
remedies one would see in the private law: constructive trusts, accounting, injunctions, and

damages with a view to disgorgement").
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treatise of the century on constitutional law 98: he should have treated the
Constitution as a fiduciary document. But he does not. He does on rare
occasions use the language of public trust. But it is metaphorical. For
example, he describes the Senate as having a great public trust because to
it is committed the trial of impeachments. 199 But it would not be plausible
to think that because the Senate has a public trust in the trial of
impeachments, Senators may be sued in federal court regarding their

verdict. Never does Story describe elected officials of the United States
as being subject to the claims and remedies of trust law. 200
Was this because of any lack of familiarity with trust instruments? That

could not be a serious claim: Story also wrote the leading nineteenthcentury treatise on equity,201 which included a brief introduction to trust

law. 202 And he wrote the leading nineteenth-century treatises on agency2 03
and on bailments. 204 If the U.S. Constitution were a fiduciary document,
then Joseph Story would have presented it that way. But he does not. 205
How could Joseph Story fail to treat the Constitution as a fiduciary

instrument? One possibility is that the fiduciary nature of the Constitution
was forgotten-but the gap between the Founding and Story's judicial
service is too slight. Another is that Story suppressed this key to the
' Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States with a Preliminary
Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, Before the Adoption of the

Constitution, 3 vols. (Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
199 2 id. at 218 ("The [constitutional] convention appears to have been very strongly
impressed with the difficulty of constituting a suitable tribunal [for the trial of an
impeachment]; and finally came to the result, that the senate was the most fit depositary of
this exalted trust.").
200 To the contrary, he emphasized political mechanisms. See id. at 70 ("The aim of every

political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men, who possess most wisdom
to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and, in the next place,
to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue their

public trust. Various means may be resorted to for this purpose; and doubtless one of the most
efficient is the frequency of elections." (quoting in part from The Federalist No. 57 (James
Madison))).
201 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in England and

America (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839).
202

Id. at 228-45.

203

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Agency, as a Branch of Commercial and

Maritime Jurisprudence, with Occasional Illustrations from the Civil and Foreign Law

(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839).
204 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments, with Illustrations from the Civil

and the Foreign Law (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846).
205 Thus Story can be cited by Lawson and Seidman for a "strict view of the authority
granted by powers of attorney in the.early nineteenth century," Lawson & Seidman, supra note

1, at 105-06, even while they fail to note that Story did not view the Constitution in this light.
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interpretation of the Constitution; that is hardly plausible, since it would
have been remarked, and Story's own incentive would have been to allow
each of his branches of learning to inform the others. The final possibility,
and the only one that to us seems plausible, is that Story understood that
the "fiduciary" descriptions of the Constitution sounded in political
morality, not in law.
CONCLUSION

There is a long tradition, going back to Plato and Cicero, of speaking
of a "ship of state." There is also a body of law that provides specific
duties for, and remedies against, the captain and crew of ships: admiralty.
Both that political theory tradition and that body of law were known to

the Founders. Indeed, there may well be terms in the Constitution that
were used in shipping contracts to regulate the conduct of the skipper. Do
the President and officers of the United States have duties enforceable in
admiralty? An affirmative conclusion is implausible. But an argument
somewhat like this one is at the heart of fiduciary constitutionalism.
This increasingly influential, and admittedly diverse, school of thought
has much to offer-it promises to add legal constraints at just the right
places (wherever you think those might be), while also adding flexibility
at just the points where it is needed. But it involves significant distortions
of fiduciary law and constitutional law. Fiduciary constitutionalists tend

to rely on a modern synthetic understanding of fiduciary law that was
simply not available at the Founding. They rely on contestable claims
about how fiduciary relationships are identified and how fiduciary
mandates are granted and constructed. And they treat as "fiduciary duties"
some legal rules that are not duties, and some duties that are not fiduciary.
If the fiduciary constitutionalists (following Finn) had framed their
project as an exercise in critical normative political theory, sounding in

political morality rather than in law, they would be free to advocate a
fiduciary refraining of public law, a new constitutional vision. Or, if they
had chosen to ground their constitutional arguments in a living
Constitution or an evolving common-law Constitution, they could have
argued that we are moving toward a fiduciary Constitution. But they have
not done so, at least not yet. They have framed their project as
constitutional interpretation grounded in fiduciary law and the Founding
era. That is the foundation on which the structure rests.

